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INTRODUCTION 
The Joint Legislative Budget Committee is one of two legislative 
committees created by statute and funded by a separate line item 
in the annual Budget Act. The Committee was created in 1941 and 
has two principal duties. 
the Legislative Analyst. 
The first is to oversee the Office of 
The Analyst and her staff provide a 
valuable service to the Legislature, annually reviewing the Gover-
nor's Budget, publishing an analysis of the budget, and reviewing 
some 3500 pieces of legislation which have a fiscal impact. 
The Committee's second duty is to review the implem~ntation of th~ 
Budget by the Administration. The Committee is charged with ap-
proving all changes in expenditure plans and expenditures of othe~ 
funds by the Administration which were not originally budgeted by .. 
the Legislature. 
Soon after being elected Chairman of the Committee, Senat·or Camp-
bell held discussions with the leadership of both houses to expand 
the duties of the Committee. When first elected to the Assembly 
in 1966, Senator Campbell felt the Legislature did a much better 
job of looking towards the future than it does today. In this 
vein, the Committee has begun to examine some of the long range 
policy issues which will be facing California as we enter the next 
.millennium. 
In order to better understand the future, the past must be under-
stood and resolved. With this in mind, the Committee has held two 
hearings to anticipate budget problems facing California in the 
next century. This report focuses on the first of these: "Propo-
sition 13, Ten Years Later." 
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Proposition 13 was probably the single most significant change 
made in the way governments, at all levels, operate in California. 
This change has caused governments in California to reduce the 
size of their operations and to put off long term planning. 
Ten years ago this coming June, the voters of California turned 
the fiscal system of their state upside down. The voters reduced 
a total of $7 billion in annual 1978-79 dollars from governments 
in California. Since that time the state legislature has recast 
the funding formulas for almost all segments of government in 
California. 
Proposition 13 was passed by the voters on June 6, 1978, placing a 
one-percent ceiling on property tax rates and stating that higher 
rates could not be imposed without a two-thirds majority of local 
voters. In addition, the initiative rolled back all property tax 
assessed values to their 1976 levels. Assessed values can be 
raised at a rate not to exceed two percent per year or the change 
in the consumer Price Index, whichever is lower. 
The tax revolt forced painful cuts in public services and, com-
bined with a recession beginning in 1980 and federal aid.reduc-
tions, le~ to a slash in the revenues available to once-flush 
California governments. Community colleges, parks, and libraries 
were singled out for serious spending and staff reductions~ more 
recently, public health and welfare programs have been signifi-
cantly reduced. 
The effects of the financial distress have fallen unevenly on the 
state and local governments. The state was flush with its surplus 
and spent accordingly for the first three years. However, 
beginning in 1982 a recession and three years of deficit spending 
forced the state to impose a standby one-percent sales tax 
increase against the possibility of an unbalanced budget. 
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Today, nine and one-half years later, the committee was told that 
the mood of the voters seems to have changed. Has the so-called 
tax revolt stopped? 
MOOD OF THE VOTERS 
Proposition 13 was approved by an overwhelming 65% of the voters, 
and two years later they passed the Proposition 4 Gann spending 
limit by 74%. Both of these actions have been taken by the Legis-
lature to mean that the voters were concerned about the high level 
of taxes. Mr. Mervin Field, with the Field Institute, confirms 
this assumption. 
In a 1978 poll of Californians, Mr. Field found that 30% volun-
teered high taxes as one of the most pressing issues in the state 
or community. By 1987 this number had dropped to just five per-
cent. Clearly the public's concerns about high taxes has declined 
to the point where it ranks behind such other issues as traffic 
congestion, aid for · the homeless, and drug usa. 
The Committee also heard that the public perception of government 
size and trustworthiness has improved dramatically since 1978. In 
that year. the publiq,· by a 60 to 30 percent margin, preferred a 
smaller government. By the time of · the Committee hearing this 
margin had changed to 49 to 42. While _it cannot be definitely 
concluded that the public is willing to P.ay higher taxes for a 
larger government, it is quite clear that the public no longer 
considers taxes in the same light as it did in 1978, the year Prop 
13 passed. 
Despite these positive attitudes Mr. Field concluded that "right 
now the public is not ready to change Prop 13. 11 Nevertheless, the 
Committee felt the time may have come to make some minor modifica-
tions to the rules governing local taxing authority • 
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IMPACT ON CALIFORNIA'S CITIES 
The Committee learned that cities have taken advantage of their 
financial independence. After losing 51% of property taxes to 
Proposition 13, cities jacked up fees they charged the public and 
began to rely more heavily on the sales tax. 
In 1978, the year Proposition 13 passed, 22% of cities' revenues 
were from property taxes. A year later this figure had declined 
to 11%. By the year 1985-86 this number was back up to 19% of 
total revenues. 
The Proposition 4 Gann limit coupled with Proposition 13 is prob-
lematic for rapidly growing areas. The Committee learned of a 
locality where high tech industries are locating. There has been 
a big surge in property tax revenues but their Gann limit has not 
gone up accordingly because there has not been the growth in popu-
lation. Problems like this have caused some areas to place seri-
ous limits on growth because they cannot use the revenues gener-
ated. 
Eight cities have reached their Gann limits and have asked the 
voters for approval to exceed them. All of these requests were 
approved. 
Before Proposition 13 many things now funded by fees were subsi-
dized by the General Fund. After its passage most cities began 
charging fees for all services which were not directly related to 
the General Fund. 
This has caused fees to increase at a rate greater than the cost 
of living. In Orange County, land development fees have increased 
219% between 1975 and 1983; for capital facilities, fees have 
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increased 559%. Hourly fees are becoming more common, but there 
is often no basis for developing the hourly rate. 
Property taxes are relatively stable in that those rates are fixed 
and the city or county can count on those funds. Fees, on the 
other hand, are dependent on the economic demand for the services 
offered. 
Proposition 13 disempowered locally elected Board members from the 
control of revenues. Although it eliminated bonding capability, 
capital outlay bond acts may now be approved by a two-thirds vote, 
due to the adoption of Proposit"ion 62. However, direct facility 
financing has continued. Major fee exactions are now in place for 
schools, transportation corridors, libraries, fire stations, and 
local transportation networks. 
The use of these fees is limited, however, by Proposition 62, 
which requires that all fees in excess of actual costs must be 
approved by the voters. Because this amendment was passed last 
November there is little history to judge its effects. 
IMPACT ON ~FORNIA 1 S COUNTI~S 
California's 58 counties have fared poorly under the reductions in 
local taxing authority. With little sales tax revenues and lim-
ited ability to raise fees, counties never enjoyed the cities' 
independence from the state. Counties now must rely on state and 
federal aid to carry out their principal duties of operating the 
health, welfare and jail progr~ms. 
The 1980 recession and new federal priorities resulted in a drop 
in federal aid, however, and state support for public health arid 
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welfare programs has been significantly reduced. This has forced 
painful cuts in the public services offered by the counties. 
Prior to Proposition 13 county boards of supervisors had broad 
responsibilities and authority to make decisions and to finance 
them. The supervisors had to weigh the feelings of special in-
terests, taxpayer watchdogs and constituents, and--if necessary--
raise the tax revenue to finance their decisions. 
Local government's ability to plan and finance long-range projects 
and to respond to emergent situation is severely limited by the 
fixed property tax revenue base created by Proposition 13. This 
I forces local government to approach Sacramento continually for the 
solution to local problems and dilutes local ~lected official's 
responsibility and accountability to the public for these solu-
tions. As recently as the 1987 Session the Legislature once again 
• • 
made an attempt to provide fiscal relief to the counties by pass-
ing SB 709 which provided for the "buy out" of the trial courts. 
:IMPACT ON CALIFORNIA 1 S PUBLIC SCHOOlS 
Public schools have become even more dependent on state government 
than counties. The state pays the lion's share of local school 
costs and local property taxes formerly intended for schools have 
been reallocated to other local governments. This new scheme has 
left schools with virtually no ability to raise money and has 
given the state great say in how the local districts spend their 
funds. 
Despite dire predictions, in the year after Proposition 13 schools 
I 
received 91% of the funds they would have received had it not 
passed. Thus the schools did not "drop off into the Pacific Ocean 
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and life did not end." But they have not been able to provide the 
resources necessary to meet the needs of the students. 
Most school boards have discretion over only 2 to 3 percent of 
their total budget to operate programs which are necessary for the 
local schools. This has led schools to become very adept at find-
ing ways to raise monies for special programs outside of the 
normal revenue stream. Bingo and swap meets have been very suc-
cessful, sometimes raising over $4,000 per week. Generally this 
income is for extracurricular activities which district funds can 
no longer support. 
Statewide, districts received 42% of their funding from the State 
prior to Proposition 13. Since 1978 this number has increased to 
85 to 90%. This has caused school districts to be at the mercy of 
the Legislature and the Administration regardless of their com-
munity's desire to supplement the funds available for community 
schools. Schools need long term funding to plan adequately. 
IMPACT ON CALIFORNIA'S BUSINESS COMMUNITY 
"Businesses do not pay taxes, the ponsumel:i . pays · taxes." This idea 
helped the passage of Proposition 13 by ·promising lower prices as 
the result of lower corporate property tax rates. The fact that 
businesses traditionally hold their property longer than indivi-
duals was expected to reduce their share of the tax burden, but 
the effect of increased fees has been to negate that tax drop. 
This may be one reason that ·prices did not drop as expected. 
Proposition 13 did not have a significant impact on the relative 
attractiveness of California vis-a-vis the rest of the country. 
The ratio of California•s ·share of personal income versus the 
country's personal income started to increase in 1973 and there 
was no dramatic shift after Proposition 13. 
The impact of Proposition 13 on the state's economy was seriously 
distorted by the severe recession the country entered in 1980. 
For example, housing units were predicted to be 319,000 if Propo-
sition 13 passed and 191,000 if it failed. In fact the actual 
number of permits issued in 1980 was 148,000. 
The economic base in California grew faster than anticipated, 
which kept the property taxes for non-residential properties in-
creasing faster than predicted, but in general commercial property 
turnovers remain slower than that of residential properties. 
Proposition 13 induced less reliance on property taxes and greater 
reliance on other taxes, especially income and sales taxes, which 
are largely levied and collected by the State. 
People will "vote with their feet" if given the opportunity. By 
permitting local governments some flexibility, some will offer a 
high level of services accompanied by high taxes, and some people 
will prefer to live there. Others will be more frugal, offering 
fewer services and lower taxes, and people will prefer to live 
there. 
There is no agreement between various governments levying fees as 
to the costs which are eligible to be included in a given service 
charge. Some cities are forecasting a deficit on the horizon and 
using this as justification for higher fees now and accumulating 
surpluses. 
Developer fees are an unstable source of income. City representa-
tives asked what happens if there is a groundswell for slow 
growth. This message moves very rapidly throughout the financial 
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community, and the banks and financial institutions and those who 
are interested in investing money in orange County are leery about 
the impact of these .kinds of initiatives. 
The Legislature chose to allocate the remaining property revenues 
by maintaining each jurisdiction's share of the property tax pie. 
In so doing the legislature rejected the alternative of apportion-
ing property taxes proportional to assessed valuation. This ap-
pears to be in violation of another California Constitutional 
provision on tax situs. This matter is headed to the courts. 
IMPACT ON CALIFORNIA'S POLICE AND FIRE SERVICES 
For California's Police and Fire Service agencies, life after 
Proposition 13 has been difficult but not impossible. In part 
this is due to the statutory priority given to these agencies; 
Language included in SB 154 says · "Funds .distributed for this sec-
tion shall be given first for police and fire programs in order 
not to jeopardize the health and safety of the community. The 
legislative body shall ensure that the level of police and fire 
protection programs actually provided in the 1977-78 fiscal year 
shall be continued." 
Technology has played a great part in increasing the effectiveness 
of law enforcement. This has allowed agencies to do more with 
less personal resources. More civilians were used to replace 
sworn offices in administrative jobs. 
According to the Attorney General Report "Crime and Delinquency in 
California," the number of law enforcement personnel increased by 
10.3 percent statewide during the past five years. Law enforce-
ment expenditures increased 62 percent in the same time period. 
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Fire Districts were funded 97.6 percent by Property taxes. Al-
lowed to proceed with no state support the districts would have 
lost two-thirds of their revenue sources. 
The creation of the Special District Augmentation Fund (SDAF) by 
AB 8 provided the permanent funding necessary for many--though not 
all--fire districts to maintain their 1987 levels of service. In 
Los Angeles County, bailouts totalling almost $37 million helped 
Fire Protection Districts there increase their combined budgets 
from $49,825,000 in 1977-78 to $60,577,000 the next year. This 
increase came despite combined tax levy losses of over $26 mil-
lion. 
But because SDAF revenues in many counties have not been stable, 
and because growth in this revenue source has not kept up with the 
growth in needs,· service increases and equipment replacement pro-
grams were put on hold. Service has therefore declined. 
Legislative solutions to addressing some of the problems with the 
SDAF have been patchwork and have not fulfilled any long term 
funding needs. To date no comprehensive legislation has provided 
a s~lution that would furnish fire districts with a stable source 
of revenue to address growth in service demand. 
Fire districts need to. be financially self-sufficient and not 
dependent upon seeking annual legislative remedies. 
WHAT THE PROPONENTS SAY 
Proposition 13 saved several million homes in California from 
foreclosure because people could not afford the previously bur-
geoning property taxes. Senior citizens on fixed incomes were now 
protected and did not have to sell or move to lesser quarters. 
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And young people and first-time home buyers found predictability 
in property taxes, allowing them to buy homes for their families 
that were within their budgets. 
Recommended changes: 
1. Special taxes for local uses be more clearly defined by the 
Legislature; 
2. Homeowner's property tax exemption be changed to be a percent-
age, rather than an absolute number, of the actual market price; 
3. All one-time fees charged not be made part of the base price 
of the building for subsequent annual tax levies. 
WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS 
With all of these changes, it may now be time to develop one inte-
grated, permanent solution to all levels of local governments. 
Instead of looking at cities, counties, schools and special dis-
tricts separately, we need to concentrate on the overall picture; 
a review of the role and financing of local governments and their 
relationships to the state and to one another is in order. 
Proposition 13 has also left a very visible legacy: public 
grounds, buildings, and other structures across the state have 
lost some of their luster as officials have cut back spending for 
maintenance and repairs. This fact was the focus of the Commit-
tee's second hearing. This report is available and is entitled: 
"California's Infrastructure Needs through the Year 2000." 
- - Page ll . __ -- ·-
SUMMARY 
A. Most local governments have found the means to live within 
their revenues, but have reduced some services to their con-
stituents. 
B. The overall size of government in California has been reduced. 
The 25-year growth of state and local government has slowed 
dramatically but not reversed. 
c. Many cities have started using user fees as means to make up 
lost revenues. These fees are often applied inconsistently 
and without a basis for the amount charged. Many also have 
cost of living increases which have no basis. 
D. Local governments feel frustrated because they have lost the 
ability to locally raise the money necessary to address their 
needs. Proposition 13 not only removed the ability for local 
officials to make changes, but it also removed the responsi-
bility for implementing that change. The ability of local 
governments to make their own resource allocation decisions 
was significantly reduced. 
E. There is a general consensus that some local fund raising 
capability should be granted to local governments. Whether 
this should just be for bonds or for general fund purposes was 
not distinguished. And whether the mechanism should be a vote 
of the Board or a vote of the people, a simple majority or 
two-thirds, a tax on property or some other taxing authority 
are issues which still need to be explored. 
F. Although it was not the subject of the hearing, there was gen-
eral agreement that the Proposition 4 Gann limit is a more 
serious matter than Proposition 13, and should be modified. 
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G. Proposition 13 provided a $7 billion boost to the economy of 
California by reducing the ·tax burden. Businesses still con-
sider California a strong marketplace but fees on local devel-
opers and reduced services are hurting. 
H. Proposition 13 has made local governments more dependent on 
state financial aid. Counties and school districts in partic-
ular are now vulnerable to the financial problems threatening 
state government. 
POSSIBLE ACTIONS FOR LEGISLATIVE CONSIDERATION 
While the Committee does not make any recommendations there was 
general agreement that: 
Property taxes have declined as a major concern in people's minds 
and public perceptions of Government have improved dramatically. 
Experience shows that people will vote for tax increases if they 
are targeted for a specific purpose. 
Due to the constraints of Proposition 4, many cities are limiting 
industrial growth because they cannot absorb the revenues gener-
ated and the businesses will be creating costs for which the city 
or county cannot afford to pay. 
Local citizens no longer have a stake in local government. The 
homeowner and the general public have walked away from local gov-
ernment; they have lost interest because there isn't anything for 
them to be concerned about. 
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THE MOOD 01;- CALIFORNIA VOTERS IN 1987 
REGARDING TAXES AND GOVERNMENT SPENDING 
Remarks of Mervin Field before the 
Joint State Legislative Budget Committee Hearing 
September 30, 1987 
My presentation is based on the results of the continuing 
public opinion research program of The California Poll and The 
Field Institute -- an independent and nonpartisan organization. 
Since 1947, we have conducted approximately 250 statewide 
surveys and issued more than 1,400 separate reports relating to 
the public's opinions, attitudes and behavior toward a variety 
of political, economic and social issues. 
Today, I will focus specifically on some of those measure-
ments we have made during the past ten years relating to the 
topics of taxes and government spending. 
(The data presented today have been reported previously in 
our published California Poll and Field.Institute reports which 
describe in detail the methodology used, sample sizes, sampling 
tolerances and other technical considerations.) 
-Introduction-

SUJ.t1ARY 
THERE IS CONSIDERABLE OBJECTIVE SURVEY EVIDENCE 
SUGGESTING THAT THE CURRENT MOOD OF THE PUBLIC IN 
RESPECT TO TAXES AND GOVERNMENT SPENDING HAS CHANGED 
MARKEDLY SINCE 1977. 
1. THE PUBLIC'S CONCERN ABOUT HIGH TAXES HAS ABATED 
SUBSTANTIALLY DURING THE PAST DECADE. TEN YEARS 
AGO IN OUR ANNUAL STUDY OF HOW THE PUBLIC VIEWS 
COt+1UNITY AND STATE PROBLEMS 11HIGH TAXES 11 AT 30% 
RANKED FIRST AS A VOLUNTEERED CATEGORY AMONG 
OTHER PROBLEMS. IN THE 1987 STUDY, HIGH TAXES AS 
A PROBLEM HAD DROPPED TO JUST 5% 
ANOTHER CONCERN RELATING TO A PERSON'S SENSE OF 
ECONOMIC WELL-BEING HAS ALSO DISSIPATED DURING 
THE PAST TEN YEARS. "INFLATION" WAS A HIGH-
RANKING PROBLEM VOLUNTEERED BY 22% OF THE PUBLIC 
IN 1977 BUT THAT PROPORTION HAS DROPPED TO JUST 
2% IN 1987. 
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TABLE 1 
WHAT ARE THE MOST PRESSING PROBLEMS 
FACING COMMUNITY/STATE? 
1987 
~ 0 
CRIME/LAW ENFORCEMENT 19 
EDUCATION/THE SCHOOLS 19 
DRUG. USE 17 
TRAFFIC CONGESTION/ROAD AND 
HIGHWAY REPAIR 16 
POLLUTION/TOXICS 15 
CARE FOR THE HOMELESS 15 
UNEMPLOYME"T 11 
HIGH TAXES 5 
AVAILABLE, AFFORDABLE HOUSING 4 
WELFARE SPENDING 3 
INFLATION 2 
* Less than one-half of one percent. 
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1977 
~ 0 
28 
14 
* 
9 
15 
4 
24 
30 
11 
12 
22 
2. THERE HAS BEEN A MARKED CHANGE IN THE PREFERENCE 
OF THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC IN RESPECT TO THEIR 
VIEWS ON THE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT. IN 1980, BY A 
60% TO 30% RATIO, THE PUBLIC SAID THEY WANTED A 
SMALLER GOVERNMENT PROVIDING FEWER SERVICES, 
RATHER THAN A LARGER GOVERNMENT WITH MORE SER-
VICES. IN 1987 THAT DIVISION HAS DROPPED TO A 
49% TO 42% RATIO. 
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TABLE 2 
PREFERENCES ABOU THE SIZE 
OF GOVERNMENT 
1987 
!!-0 
PREFER SMALLER GOVERNMENT 
PROVIDING FEWER SERVICES 49 
PREFER LARGER GOVERNMENT 
PROVIDING MORE SERVICES 42 
No OPINION 9 
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1980 
!!-0 
60 
30 
10 
3. THERE IS A DECIDED WEAKENING IN SUPPORT FOR THE 
STATE'S GANN SPENDING LIMITATION MEASURE, WHICH 
VOTERS OVERWHEUMINGLY APPROVED IN 1979 BY A 74% 
TO 26% MARGIN. THE 1987 SURVEY FINDS THAT JUST 
49% OF THE PUBLIC NOW SUPPORTS KEEPING THE GANN 
LIMIT IN ITS PRESENT FORM, WHILE 40% FEEL IT 
SHOULD BE AMENDED TO PERMIT GREATER FLEXIBILITY 
IN STATE SPENDING. 
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TABLE 3 
GANN STATE SPENDING LIMITATION LAW 
fAVOR 
OPPOSE 
1979 VOTE 
1987 OPINION 
KEEP LIMIT 
AMEND LAW 
No OPINION 
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74% 
26 
49% 
40 
11 . 
4. IN ANOTHER STATEWIDE CALIFORNIA POLL SURVEY TAKEN 
IN LATE JULY 1987, WE FOUND THAT BY A MARGIN OF 
57% TO 38% VOTERS EXPRESSED THE BELIEF THAT IT 
WOULD BE BETTER TO GIVE THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS THE 
STATE'S CURRENT SURPLUS FUNDS THAN TO REBATE THE 
MONEY TO STATE INCOME TAXPAYERS. 
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TABLE 4 
REBATE $700 MILLION IN SURPLUS TO 
TAXPAYERS OR GIVE MONEY TO SCHOOLS 
STATEWIDE 
GIVE TO SCHOOLS 57 
REBATE TO TAXPAYERS 38 
No OPINION 5 
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5. IN OUR 1987 SURVEY, GREATER THAN SEVEN IN TEN 
CALIFORNIANS (71%) SAY THEY WOULD FAVOR LOCAL TAX 
INCREASES IF NEEDED FOR SUCH PURPOSES AS INCREAS-
ING THE NUMBER OF POLICE OR FIRE FIGHTERS, IMPROV-
ING ROADS OR THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, OR BUILDING NEW 
WATER OR SEWER LINES. 
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TABLE 5 
OPINION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT RAISING TAXES 
FOR A SPECIFIC PURPOSE, SUCH AS POLICE, FIRE 
ROADS, SCHOOLS OR SEWER LINES, IF NEEDED 
FAVOR 
OPPOSE 
No OPINION 
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STATEWIDE 
!!!' 0 
71 
22 
7 
6. CONTRIBUTING TO THIS MORE TOLERANT VIEW OF 
INCREASED GOVERNMENT SPENDING IS THE PERCEPTION 
THAT VARIOUS LEVELS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
ARE DOING A BETTER JOB IN MAKING EFFICIENT USE OF 
TAX DOLLARS. CURRENTLY, 46% OF THE PUBLIC RATE 
THEIR LOCAL CITY GOVERNMENT AS DOING AN EXCELLENT 
OR GOOD JOB IN EFFICIENTLY USING TAX DOLLARS, 
WHILE JUST 15% THINK THEY ARE DOING A POOR OR 
VERY POOR JOB. lOCAL COUNTY GOVERNMENTS ARE 
RATED MORE POSITIVELY THAN NEGATIVELY BY A 38% TO 
18% MARGIN, WHILE THE STATE GOVERNMENT'S POSITIVE 
TO NEGATIVE RATINGS ARE 28% TO 23%. EACH OF 
THESE FINDINGS REPRESENTS SIGNIFICANT INCREASES 
IN THE PUBLIC'S POSITIVE ASSESSMENT OF HOW EACH 
LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT IS USING TAX DOLLARS. 
-11-
TABLE 6 
JOB EACH LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT IS DOING 
IN MAKING EFFICIENT USE OF TAX DOLLARS 
1987 1980 
~ 0 ~ 0 
LOCA CITY GOVERNMENT 
EXCELLE T/GOOD 46 29 
AIR 33 37 
POOR/VERY POOR 15 25 
No OPINION 6 9 
LOCA COUNTY GOVERNMENT 
ExCELLENT/GOOD 38 26 
fAIR 38 38 
POOR/VERY POOR 18 28 
No OPINION 6 8 
STATE GOVERNMENT 
EXCELLENT/GOOD 28 15 
'fAIR 45 42 
POOR/VERY POOR 23 41 
No OPINION 4 2 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
EXCELLENT/GOOD 12 5 
FAIR 33 28 
POOR/VERY POOR 55 66 
No OPINION 
* 
1 
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7. SINCE 1977 WE HAVE OBTAINED TRACKING MEASURES IN 
RESPECT TO HOW THE PUBLIC FEELS ABOUT A VARIETY 
OF STATE SPENDING CATEGORIES. EACH TIME WE ASK 
REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLES OF CALIFORNIA TAXPAYERS 
WHETHER THEY FAVORED INCREASING, HOLDING THE LINE 
OR CUTTING BACK ON SPECIFIC STATE SPENDING 
CATEGORIES. 
IN OUR MOST RECENT SURVEY TAKEN THIS YEAR, SIX-
TEEN DIFFERENT SPENDING CATEGORIES WERE INCLUDED. 
IN OUR 1987 CALIFORNIA OPINION INDEX REPORT ON 
TAXES AND GOVERNMENT SPENDING WE SHOWED THE YEAR 
BY YEAR RESULTS. TODAY, FOR THE SAKE OF BREVITY, 
I WILL SHOW JUST TWO MEASURES -- 1977 COMPARED TO 
1987. 
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8. PLURALITIES FAVOR INCREASES IN TEN CATEGORIES 
IN TEN OF SIXTEEN BUDGET CATEGORIES OUR 1987 
SURVEY SHOWS A PLURALITY OF RESIDENTS FAVOR 
INCREASING THE AMOUNT THE STATE IS NOW SPENDING. 
THESE CATEGORIES INCLUDE LOCAL PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
(68%), PUBLIC ASSISTANCE TO THE ELDERLY AND 
DISABLED (67%), LAW ENFORCEMENT (60%), MENTAL 
HEALTH (57%), CORRECTIONS (STATE AND LOCAL 
PRISONS) (51%), HIGHER EDUCATION (51%), ENVIRON-
MENTAL REGULATIONS (50%), AND MEDICAL CARE 
PROGRAMS SUCH AS MEDI-CAL (48%). 
WHEN COMPARED TO EARLIER MEASURES, THE CURRENT 
FINDINGS SUGGEST THAT THE PROPORTION WHO BELIEVE 
SPENDING SHOULD BE INCREASED FOR EACH CATEGORY IS 
AT OR NEAR THE HIGHEST LEVEL IT HAS EVER BEEN 
SINCE 1977, WHEN THESE QUESTIONS WERE FIRST 
POSED. 
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TABLE 7 
STATE SPENDING CATEGORIES WHERE 
THERE IS PLURALITY OF SUPPORT FOR INCREASES 
HELD 
THE 
INCREASED SAME 
LOCAL PUBLIC SCHOOLS <K-12) 
1987 68% 29 
1977 43% 45 
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 
TO THE ELDERLY AND DISABLED 
1987 67% 28 
1980 66% 29 
lAW ENFORCEMENT (POLICE 
PROTECTION) 
1987 60% 36 
1977 55% 39 
MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAMS 
1987 57% · 36 
1977 56% 35 
CuT 
BACK 
2 
8 
3 
3 
3 
4 
5 
4 
Note: The "no opinion" category represents the difference 
between the sum of the percentages and 100%. 
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TABLE 7 
STATE SPENDING CATEGORIES WHERE 
THERE IS PLURALITY OF SUPPORT FOR INCREASES 
(CONTINUED) 
HELD 
THE 
INCREASED SAME 
CORRECTIONS (STATE AND 
LOCAL PRISONS) 
1987 51% 39 
1977 30% 49 
HIGHER EDUCATION SUCH AS 
UNIVERSITIES, STATE COLLEGES 
AND LOCAL COMMUNITY COLLEGES 
1987 51% 42 
1977 28% 57 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS 
1987 50% 39 
1977 31% 53 
MEDICAL CARE PROGRAMS 
SUCH As MEDI-CAL 
1987 48% 39 
1977 31% 48 
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CuT 
BACK 
7 
13 
6 
12 
8 
12 
11 
16 
9. INCREASE TWO NEW SPENDING CATEGORIES 
VERY LARGE MAJORITIES -- 73% AND 66%. RESPECTIVELY 
-- FAVOR INCREASED SPENDING FOR AIDS RESEARCH AND 
AID TO THE HOMELESS, TWO NEW SPENDING CATEGORIES 
WHERE PUBLIC OPINION WAS MEASURED FOR THE FIRST 
TIME IN 1987. 
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TABLE 8 
TWO OTHER STATE SPENDING AREAS 
WHERE THERE ARE PLURALITIES OF SUPPORT 
HELD 
THE CuT 
987 INCREASED SAME BACK 
AIDS RESEARCH 
AID TO HOMELESS 
(Not measured in prior years) 
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73% 
66% 
22 
25 
3 
6 
10. fOUR CATEGORIES WHERE PUBLIC DIVIDES BETWEEN 
INCREASED SPENDING AND HOLDING THE LINE 
IN FOUR OF THE SIXTEEN CATEGORIES, THE STATEWIDE 
PUBLIC DIVIDES AUMOST EVENLY'BETWEEN THOSE WHO 
FEEL SPENDING SHOULD BE INCREASED AND THOSE WHO 
FEEL IT SHOULD REMAIN ABOUT THE SAME. THESE 
INCLUDE SPENDING FOR PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION, STATE 
ROAD AND HIGHWAY BUILDING AND REPAIR, PUBLIC 
HOUSING, AND PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ·TO LOW INCOME 
FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN. 
THERE HAS BEEN GROWING SUPPORT FOR GREATER 
SPENDING FOR STATE ROAD AND HIGHWAY BUILDING AND 
REPAIR SINCE THE INSTITUTE FIRST BEGAN TRACKXNG 
THE ISSUE IN 1977. AT THAT TIME, JUST 16% 
FAVORED INCREASED SPENDING IN THIS AREA. AT 
PRESENT THE PROPORTION WHO FAVORS MORE SPENDING 
HAS RISEN TO 42%. 
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TABLE 9 
SPENDING CATEGORI S WHERE PUBLIC 
DIVIDES BETWEEN INCREASED SPENDING 
AND HOLDING THE LINE 
HELD 
THE 
INCREASED SAME 
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION 
1987 42% 45 
1977 54% 32 
STATE ROAD AND HIGHWAY 
BUILDING AND REPAIR 
1987 42% 51 
1977 16% 65 
PUBLIC HOUSING 
1987 41% 41 
1977 30% 41 
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 
FOR LOW INCOME FAMILIES 
WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN 
1987 37% 45 
1977 27% 47 
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CuT 
BACK 
11 
11 
6 
16 
15 
23 
16 
23 
11. Two CATEGORIES WHERE PUBLIC FAVORS HOLDING THE 
LINE 
lARGE PLURALITIES OF THE PUBLIC BELIEVE THAT 
STATE SPENDING FOR PARKS, RECREATION, FISH AND 
GAME, AS WELL AS THE REGULATION OF BUSINESS AND 
THE PROFESSIONS, SHOULD BE HELD AT CURRENT 
LEVELS. THESE FINDINGS ARE GENERALLY SIMILAR TO 
THOSE FOUND IN PREVIOUS YEARS. 
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TABLE 10 
SPENDING CATEG RIES WHERE 
PUBLIC FAVORS HOLDING THE LINE 
INCREASED 
PARKS AND RECREATIONAL 
FACILITIES, STATE PARKS, 
FISH AND GAME 
1987 29% 
1977 25% 
REGULATION OF BUSINESS 
AND THE PROFESSIONS 
1987 16% 
1977 13% 
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HELD 
THE CuT 
SAME BACK 
60 10 
64 10 
55 23 
56 20 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: our next witness will be Mr. Tom Wall, the 
Vice Chairman of the Irvine Chamber of Commerce. 
We won't ask you to comment on the split roll, Tom. 
MR. WALL: Thank you very much, Senator, and ladies and gentle-
men. 
I am representing here my Chamber of Commerce as the Vice Chair-
man of their Government Affairs Council. I'm also President of a real 
estate development company in the local area. 
I've been asked to comment on the impact of Prop. 13 on the 
business community and perhaps more specifically on the development 
community, because we have seen a change in the way that taxes and fees 
are collected as a result of Proposition 13. 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: Let me further clarify the introduction for 
the audience, because as Mr. Wall has said, he's the Vice President of 
the Chamber of Commerce, but he's President and Chie~ Executive Officer 
of Pacifica West Properties in Newport Beach. His areas of specializa-
tion include project design, development and management, financial 
modeling and analysis, and long-range planning. 
13 and 
We've asked him to speak in both his capacities this morning. 
Please continue. 
MR. WALL: Just for a moment, I'd like to take a look at Prop. 
summarize it for myself as much as anyone, and take a look at 
the business impact, and then I'd like to address specifically from the 
City of Irvine's point of view of what we think the impact of Prop. 13 
has been. 
Prop. 13 limited ad valorem taxation of real property to one 
percent of the assessed value except for voter-authorized general obli-
gation bonds. The assessed value of property was limited to the 1975-
1976 value adjusted for inflation, unless there's a change of ownership 
or remodeling. The assessed value may be increased not to exceed two 
percent, depending upon economic statistics or decreased due to damage, 
destruction or deflation. 
Special taxes, the proceeds of which are earmarked for special 
programs, may be levied with the approval of two-thirds vote by the 
citizens. 
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Now, the impact on business, we feel, has been that since tra-
ditionally businesses hold their land longer, if you believe that 
premise, than individuals do, the impact has been a reduction in the 
tax rates or tax payments to cities for businesses because, as I say, 
traditionally they hold their land for a longer period of time. And 
for those businesses who had land in the city prior to 1978, and their 
business tax reduced, of course, without a change of ownership, they're 
not going to see an increase in property taxes. 
so, on the one hand, since Proposition 13 served its purpose 
for reducing property tax values for individuals, it probably was a 
boon for the business community. 
The Gann initiative, I'd like to mention it just for a minute, 
and just discuss the impact on business. We see in the Chamber the 
result of the Gann initiative has been that costs that were normally 
shared by all, that is businesses and individuals, have been shifted to 
business through the imposition of user fees and taxes. What's hap-
pened is that property taxes are relatively stable. They're a stable 
source of revenue for the community. When we reduced this property 
tax, it caused the cities to, in some way, scramble to find other 
sources of revenue to meet the obligations of the citizens to provide 
essential services. 
We think that although business taxes, business property taxes, 
were reduced as a result of Proposition 13, other taxes have been im-
posed on the business community which are economically driven, as op-
posed to driven by the more stable areas like property taxes. 
The effect of Prop. 13 on the City of Irvine specifically, the 
cumulative impact of Prop. 13 on city revenues, the city of Irvine has 
lost an estimated $15.4 million in property tax revenue since the pas-
sage of Prop. 13 in June of 1978. This is based upon the continuation 
of this 27 cent property tax rate which was in effect in 1978. 
As you know, just prior to the passage of Prop. 13, cities were 
reluctant to raise their property tax rate for fear that they would be 
accused of scrambling at the 11th hour to get an increase in property 
tax before the bill was passed. 
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Irvine was already the lowest property tax rate city in Orange 
county, with the exception of Yerba Linda, who had no property taxes. 
It was locked into this new rate as a result of Proposition 13. 
The initial impact of Prop. 13 on the City of Irvine was the 
following: In May of 1978, the City staff projected a loss of $1.3 
million to $1.7 million for fiscal year 1978 through 1979 if Prop. 13 
were passed. We had a subsequent bailout as a result of State subven-
tion, and that lessened the impact, but of course that $7 billion, that 
magic $7 billion, was virtually wiped out after the passage of Prop. 
13. 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: Senator Beverly. 
SENATOR BEVERLY: One question just for the record. 
When was Irvine incorporated? 
FROM THE AUDIENCE: In '71. 
MR. WALL: As a chartered city. 
Even with the bailout in fiscal year 1978-79, property tax 
revenues dropped from $1.45 million in the prior fiscal year to 
683,000, a decrease of $773,000 or a 53 percent decrease. 
General Fund revenues shifted away from property taxes to fees. 
Since the passage of Prop. 13, property tax revenues have been contrib-
uting increasingly less to the operation of the City. In the last 
decade, property tax revenues have dropped from their overall initial 
impact of about 15 percent of General Fund revenues to about 10 percent 
of General Fund revenues. 
In June of 1978, the City imposed what's called a systems de-
velopment charge, or soc charge, to pay for the cost of services and 
infrastructure that was demanded by new development in the city. The · 
SDC fee was imposed after several studies showed that the city was 
facing a long-term funding shortfall in capital financing if no new 
revenue sources were forthcoming. 
In nine years, the soc fee has raised $23.1 million in revenue, 
and of course these fees can be used only for capital improvements. 
Developer fees have increased as City service costs have risen. 
Since the passage of Prop. 13, the City has attempted to have service 
users pay directly for those services through the charging of fees. 
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Now, this is where we get into what the Chamber perceives and I person-
ally perceive an imbalance in the way these fees are imposed. 
Irvine is one of the fastest growing cities in the nation, and 
the City's budget is therefore sensitive to the rate of development 
because of our low property tax rate. Developer fees have increased to 
reflect the increasing costs of providing services. 
And I might add here parenthetically that developers don't pay 
the fees, as you know. People pay fees. People pay taxes. Developers 
collect fees. What's happened is, we have a movement to impose fees on 
developers because developers, in some communities and in some instanc-
es, have developed a reputation of raping and pillaging the land. 
But these fees are in fact passed on to tenants who lease 
space, to the people who buy homes. So the ultimate consumer indivi-
dual reaches for his or her checkbook and pays for those fees. 
Developer fees have increased to reflect the increasing need 
for City revenues. In the last three years, the City's hourly rate for 
developer fees has increased $44 an bour to $60 per hour. That is the 
processing fee the City charges for moving the plans through the plan 
check process, and that's an increase of 36 percent. 
Development-related revenues, however, are unpredictable. 
Development-related revenue sources are very volatile and unstable, and 
they're dependent upon the developer. What happens here is, we see a 
ground swell for what's called a slow growth initiative, whereby 26 
cities in the unincorporated area of Orange County are about to put 
their initiative on the ballot in June to slow the rate of growth of 
development. 
Well, that message moves very rapidly throughout the financial 
community in this country. Although we have a boom economy in Orange 
county and L.A. County, the banks and financial institutions and those 
who are interested in investing money in Orange County are leery about 
the impact of those kind of initiatives. 
The City cannot effectively plan for long-range capital im-
provements because developer-related revenues are very unpredictable. 
The soc fee, approximately $23 million , is simply collecting that money 
and holding it until such time as needed improvements are scheduled for 
initiation. 
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Property taxes, of course, are relatively stable in that those 
rates are fixed, and the City can count on those funds. 
Because of all these factors, the City has been forced to re-
duce its services and raise new revenues, specifically this year. So 
we've seen that it's taken some time for the full impact of Prop. 13 . 
has worked its way to the City funding and expenditure areas. 
This year -- I'm sorry, the City faced a projected $4.4 million 
shortfall this year, 1987-1988; $2.5 million in cuts were made to City 
services. city staff was reduced 4 percent. We have a rather unusual 
hiring and firing policy, layoff policy, which I won't get into, but 
suffice it to say the City staff was reduced by 25 employees. $1.9 
million in new revenues were raised by a business license tax increase, 
a new utility users tax was imposed, and new landscape assessment dis-
tricts were created. So, the preponderance of the fees generated are 
now in the area of the business community. And what's happened is that 
with slow growth initiatives, with pro-resident feeling and sentiment 
in orange county, we're seeing that it's very easy for city councils 
and local officials to put the onus on the business community to pay, 
perhaps, more than I perceive to be their fair share of these new reve-
nue increases. 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: Are you aware of the recent bill that the 
Governor just singed, the trial court bailout, where the State will 
take over trial courts? It includes a provision for no and low proper-
ty tax cit~es, that no and low property tax cities will over a ten-year 
period get up to a total of 10 cents from local property taxes. 
To Irvine, that's over 5 million a year. 
MR. WALL: That's wonderful. We can use it, but I'm sure it'll 
be spent the way things are going now. 
Let me talk about just for a moment the general implications 
and effects of Prop. 13. Shifting again from relatively stable funding 
to new sources, which are economically based -- that is, sales taxes 
and developer fees. We have shifted from taxes of general application 
to taxes of specific application. Property taxes affecting all resi-
dents, other taxes affecting targeted segments of the economy. 
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We've had a loss of local control, and I want to raise one 
issue in just a minute, and specifically the issue of school and commu-
nity college funding. 
We think that Prop. 13 has served its intended purpose, and 
that was to reduce the burden on the taxpayer, reduce the burden on the 
property owner. But we feel it's probably a zero-sum impact when you 
get right down to it. 
Someone mentioned that people are willing to pay for services. 
I'm not sure that they are. My perception is that people think that 
when property taxes are reduced, oh boy, we're getting a windfall, when 
in fact, if we want quality services, we have to be able to pay for 
them. It's not going to come free. 
The issue that I'd like to close on has to do with the impact 
on schools and community colleges. In the City of Irvine, we are very 
concerned about the contribution that community colleges and schools 
make. It's a national asset; it's a fundamental asset to this country. 
Irvine Valley College, on which I'm a member of the Irvine 
College Development Council, is trying desperately to provide training 
for business. That is, the college reaches out to the community to 
provide training in needed areas for businesses within the community of 
Irvine. 
The result of Prop. 13 was the shift of the tax base from local 
property to state General Fund. It disempowered locally elected board 
members in the control of revenues. It eliminated bonding capability, 
and now some of that has been returned to capital outlay. 
In growth areas, the responsiveness of the State cannot be 
relied upon to meet the local demand. The Legislature became the 
school board, so we in effect have lost local control of our schools in 
some respects and state colleges in other respects to provide the kind 
of services that the community thinks are important in a vibrant and 
growing economic area. Particularly for community colleges, the gov-
erning structure was effectively wiped out. The strain on the system 
of local care was lost. And frankly, we see that as a serious negative 
effect of Prop. 13. 
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That concludes my comments on the behalf of the Chamber, and on 
behalf of myself as a local businessman. I'll be happy to answer any 
questions. 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: I have a couple of questions. 
Have you done any surveys in Irvine to determine what impact 
developer fees have on the price of housing? What percentage would 
that represent as an increase in housing costs as a result of developer 
fees? 
MR. WALL: The simple answer is I have not, because I'm not a 
residential builder. But I know that those fees are available, and I 
do know that that information is available. In fact, I can work with 
the Chamber and other developers 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: Come to think of it, our next witness may 
get into that. 
Mr. Wall, thank you very much. We appreciate your being here 
today. 
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PHILIP BETTENCOURT 
PREVIEW REAL ESTATE SERVICES 
May 5, 1987 
Mr. John Erskine 
Executive Director 
12 l>EL HEY 
IRVINE, CALIFORNIA 92715 
(714)854-4868 
Second Printing 
Building Industry Association of Southern California, Inc. 
Orange County Region 
200 I East Fourth Street, Suite 224 
Santa Ana , California 92705 
Subject: Building Industry Association 1987 Land Development Fee Survey 
Dear John: 
Enclosed is the final report of our county-wide survey of land development 
fees in Orange County, California. 
We surveyed the fees now charged in all 26 cities and the County of Orange. 
We consulted with the joint Sanitation Districts of Orange County. Finally, we polled 
the county's school districts since all districts are now levying new construction taxes 
under legislation signed by the Governor September 9, 1986. 
Charges Surveyed in this Study. More than 750 data entries were tallied. 
The 25 most common development fees for a new home subdivision within each juris-
diction are set forth in seven categories:- Environmental; Planning; Building; En-
gineering & Subdivision including both plan check and field inspection; Capital 
Facilities and Connections including any annexation charges; School Fees; and, Other 
Fees such as the final trac~ map checking fees charged by the County Surveyor. 
Earlier Suneys Recalled. The Building Industry Association Chapter in 
Orange County has undertaken occasional development fee surveys since at least 
1979. The last edition circulated to the public was in 1982. A 1985 edition of the 
survey was compiled but was not published. 
Enclosed as Appendix A is the 1982 survey. 
Other Trade Association Surveys Reviewed. We have relied on the methodol-
ogy and formatting selections in the excellent fee survey published annually by the 
Construction Industry Federation of San Diego County, the CIF Annual Fee Survey. 
In fact, we recommend that the Orange County region make this annual update a 
chapter project, just as our colleagues in San Diego have done . 
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Survey Methodology Reviewed. In doing our field work, we learned the hard 
way from the experience of the San Diego County researchers: There is no "one-stop 
shop" for development fees. Despite considerable familiarity with the local govern-
ments of Orange County, this "public" infor mation about development fees and taxes 
is not so easy to obta in. We interviewed more than 100 public officials to compile our 
data . More than 3000 pages of documents were reviewed. The initial draft was then 
circulated to the city engineer, planning director and building official in each juris-
diction for confirmation (see Appendix "B"). A reminder letter was sent ten days 
later. Although not every city responded, the editorial review was invaluable from 
those who did reply. We appreciate their help. 
Formatting Refined. We were determined to better the 1982 and 1985 edi-
tions of the survey by obtaining a record copy of the actual enabling legislation that 
actually authorized the fees or service charges. Rather than relying on a traditional 
mail or telephone survey, we made personal visits to all 26 cities and County offices. 
We called at the Planning, Public Works and Building Departments and asked for 
copy -- at our expense -- of the actual published schedule of charges and the enabling 
statute. When statutes were not available -- and most times they were not -- we 
visited the city clerk's office and searched city records for applicable ordinances or 
resolutions. 
We found a number of courteous but unprepared staff members at the coun-
ter who more often than not, just did not have the tools at hand to answer our ques-
tions. 
There were notable exceptions. The City of Irvine has published excellent 
work sheets for consumers on each and every development entitlement application 
and the appropriate fees. 
The City of Yorba Linda staff was most helpful, courteous and attentive to 
our inquiry. The Fountain Valley City Manager maintains for public review a com-
plete handbook of the legal basis for every fee. The County of Orange Environmen-
tal Management Agency even pitched-in to help pull the survey together. 
We thank all the fine public officials who helped with this project. 
A check list and guide is enclosed at Appendix C to help you do your own fee 
research and develop a fee strategy. 
More Explicit Categories. One difficulty with earlier chapter surveys was 
that processing charges and facilities charges were co-mingled. This year, more 
categories were tallied and capital facilities and connection charges were segregated 
from engineering and subdivision processing fees. 
Typical Subdivision Again Utilized. As was done in earlier survey editions, 
we wanted to know the cost for fees on a prototype 50-unit single family, detached 
subdivision on a 10-acre site with identical 1500 square foot homes. We d id not, 
however, make direct agency-to-agency comparisons. There are simply too many 
variables to develop a meaningful "highest and lowest" fee determination. Instead, 
like our San Diego colleagues, we have provided a comprehensive catalog so that you 
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~an form your own conclusions about fcc parity . 
The attached Appendix D shows how the subdivision works and the other 
survey assumptions. We also provided worksheets from the County Environmental 
Management Agency to show how this test subdivision would be processed and what 
final fees and charges would be. 
FINDINGS 
1. Direct Facility Financing is a Major Trend. It should come as no surprise 
that land development fees have skyrocketed since California's tax limitation initia-
tive, Proposition \3 . Cities have felt strapped, unable to fulfill their traditional 
leadership role in financing public infrastructure. They have turned to the often 
vulnerable development community to make up the difference as traditional revenue 
sources have stagnated. 
The biggest news in this taxing revolution, of course, has been the growth of 
direct facility exactions for public infrastructure. There is very little of the public 
in modern day in-tract public works. Sewer, water, storm drain, street, sidewalk and 
street light systems are all paid for in advance by the installing developer -- and 
ultimately by the new home consumer. 
It is apparent that public agencies are not able to keep up their end of the 
traditional bargain for providing public facilities. They have no match for matching 
fund.s. Bonding capacity is curtailed. Only the Mello-Roos benefit assessment district 
law has permitted any considerable region-wide financing. The agency facilitates 
implementation. Home buyers still shoulder the cost, but over a more bearable time 
frame. 
Since the last edition of this survey was published, facility financing fees arc 
now in place in selected jurisdictions for schools, libraries, fire stations and even 
regional transportation corridors. We also found several generic system development 
charges. 
2. Fees Are Increasing at a Rate Greater than COLA. Development fees arc 
increasing at a rate greater than the general cost of living (COLA). There are no 
settled cost-of -living criteria for public agencies in raising fixed (ees. The City of 
Tustin during the course of our survey, for instance, increased the fee for processing 
a zone change from $250 to $750, a substantial increase since the fee was last revised 
in 1981. The increase would appear to bear no particular relationship to the cost of 
living. 
Although we made no exhaustive comparisons, the data we were given by 
public officials demonstrates that, in most jurisdictions, fees for services are going up 
faster than the cost of living. 
There were exceptions. The City of Fullerton, for instance, couples some 
fees directly to an automatic cost-of-living inflator. The City of Laguna Beach tics 
annual storm water facility assessments to published cost indices. 
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In some c1t1es, San Juan Capistrano, for instance, the storm water drainage 
assessment automatic inflator rate is 10% annually for "the cost of living", even 
though the actual COLA has been well beneath that rate in recent years. A construc-
tion cost index has been included at Append ix E to again help you in evaluating fee 
parity. 
Most adjustments greater than the cost of living have been occasioned by 
staff members recommending redefinitions of cost and new methods of casting the 
fees themselves. 
We recommend that the Chapter urge public agencies to couple fees more 
closely to the actual published cost of doing business and agree upon generally ac-
cepted accounting principles for measuring the cost of services. 
3. Hourly Rates Are Becoming More Common. More jurisdictions are turn-
ing to hourly rates to assess processing fees. The City of Irvine, for instance, has 
adopted a rate of $60 per hour for planners to plan and for engineers to engineer 
development entitlements. The County of Orange utilizes an hourly schedule with 
fees ranging up to $37 per hour. Most County of Orange planning functions are now 
also on an hourly basis with fees up to $37 per hour. The City of Brea was consider-
ing a similar hourly formula for some fees when we went to press. 
While such hourly rates are fairly common in engineering drawing plan 
check, we found increasing use of hourly rates in the checking of building plans and 
even planning land use entitlement processing. 
Given strict accountability and the use of compettttve rates, this is not an 
unhealthy trend for the industry. Ple.ase again consult Appendix C for guidance. 
4. Accounting Practices Are Rarely Uniform in Public: Agencies. We were 
not charged to make a study of the accounting practices of cities. We did, however, 
examine a number of sincerely written staff reports and cost studies on what "actual 
costs" were. The City of Irvine now insists upon $~0 an hour. So does the City of 
Santa Ana for some specialized engineering plan check. The City of Orange gets the 
same jobs done for $35 per hour. All of these rates include payroll burden. 
Obviously, no two agencies have identical overhead rates but neither, did we 
learn, do they have any published standards common to all agencies for determining 
such rates. We found no solid justification for the higher overhead rate utilized to 
reach $60 an hour in Irvine and Santa Ana. · 
Lay people are at a loss to intelligently evaluate · such numbers. That's 
unfortunate. We hope more cities find a common ground for their cost accounting 
practices so that we can all work with the same numbers. 
S. Supporting Documents Are Often Inadequate. Unfortunately, most cities . 
could not produce a supporting document that detailed all land development fees. 
When such documents did exist, they often had to first be compiled from dog-eared 
notebooks, and then verified for authentici ty at the city clerk's office. Some were 
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highly abbreviated bulletins that contained few working rules on actual computation 
applications. One south county water district even refused to release their fcc 
schedule without a written request "on company letterhead." 
And, as we said, the one-stop shop is the exception, not the rule . 
. 
We think public officials and the development community would be better 
served by distributing complete copies on demand -- and at a cost, if they like -- of 
the actual ordinances and resolutions establishing development fees. 
6. Clerk Records valuable, but amended resolutions misleading. We found 
that the city clerk's office is an invaluable depository of the City Council's proceed-
ings and laws as embodied in ordinances and resolutions. 
What slowed down our research for you was an all too common city practice 
of amending resolutions rather than originating fresh documents. The researcher is 
then left with an arduous search through resolutions to find out if the fees in ques-
tion are the most current. The City of Huntington Beach, for instance, had one fcc 
resolution that was amended more than a dozen times. 
Constantly amending resolutions makes the law almost unintelligible for out-
siders. We don't blame the city clerks for this practice. 
7. Statements of Actual Charges Were Not Common. Engineering plan check 
charges are typically on an hourly basis. Most developers are so relieved to get their 
plans through the plan check process that they seldom question the final numbers. We 
suspect they may have little informed basis anyway. In looking through sample map 
checking files we found that the itemized statement was the exception rather than the 
rule. Most billings were a lump sum without an hourly· accounting of the billing . 
employee's time, task, and hourly rate. 
Hourly rates continue to edge upward. We think ctttes and other regulatory 
authorities should commit to providing itemized statements if they are not doing so 
already. It's good business, good public business. 
8. Fees Add to the Cost of Housing. In May, 1986 testimony before the 
California Senate Select Committee on Planning for California's Growth (Senator 
Marian Bergeson, chairman), Ben Bartolotta of California's respected Construction 
Industry Research Board, provided important data on the impact of infrastructure 
fees on new housing. 
Bartolotta compared 1975 with 1983 fee results to determine average fees 
charged for new single-family housing in selected Southern California jurisdictions. 
Here is what he learned: 
-Excluding increases attributable to inflation, such fees have increased an 
average of 219% since 1975. ·Infrastructure fees have increased a whopping 559% 
since 1975; 
-The 28 jurisdictions in the CIRB survey accounted for two-thirds of all 
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single-family housing production in Southern California. 
-The effective average fee charged is $5,176 per dwelling unit. The sum of 
averages is $7,724. The effective average is arrived at by discounting for jurisdic-
tions that do not yet charge specific facility fees. 
A cursory review of the CIRB ana ysis when compared with the Orange 
County data in this latest survey tells us: 
-Most building in Orange County is occurring in jurisdictions that have 
facility and processing fees well in excess of the region's and the state's average 
charges; 
-While major increases in our County have occurred for capital facility 
charg.es, our experience parallels the CIRB data that shows planning and zoning serv-
ice fees and building permit fees are closer to following the historic rate of inflation. 
9. Payment At Final Inspection Should be Requested. Builders and 
developers should be aware of the opportunity for payment of some fees at the time 
of final inspection or certificate of occupancy pursuant to AB-3314. Enclosed as 
Appendix F, is a bulletin recently distributed by your BIA Region staff; and, an 
Implementation Guide jointly prepared by the League of California Cities, the 
County Supervisors Association and the American Planning Association. 
Builders should be aware that fees can still be collected earlier on in the 
development process if certain conditions are met by the collecting agency. 
10. Most Expensive City for Processing. The City of Irvine charged more for 
processing entitlement requests and for evaluating and checking plans than did any 
other city in the county or the County gov~rnment. 
The City of Irvine utilizes a unitary billing system; i.e., all employees in a 
given function bill project hours at the same rate, regardless of the actual compensa-
tion paid those employees. 
The County of Orange, by contrast, also utilizes hourly formulas but bills the 
time at the regulating employee's actual rate. 
Our test case General Plan Amendment, for example, requires 100 billable 
hours to process. The application would cost $3600 or $72 per home in the County. 
The same event in the City of Irvine would be $6000. That's $120 per home, or nearly 
double the County charges. 
Public improvement plan checking fees could cost as much as $97 per hour in 
the city of San Clemente for utilization of outside plan checking supervisors. 
11. Most Expensive Facility Fees. It looks as if the City of San Clemente 
regulating agencies charge more for the same fundamental infrastructure than in 
other cities. Such fees are easily more than $15,000 per home in emerging so-called 
"back country" areas of the city. Consult the San Clemente schedule for details. Also, 
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see the City of San Juan Capistrano schedule. 
12. l~clationship to Actual Cost Needs More Scrutiny. Although not au cle-
ment of this particular engagement, we are intrigued by the relationship between 
revenues collected and the cost of provision of governmental services, particularly 
since the public agency budget season is now upon us. 
Section 13 of the California Government Code at Section 54990, "Zoning and 
Permit Fees; Limitations," provides that fees for· zoning variances, zoning changes, 
use permits, building inspections, building permits, processing of maps or planning 
services shall not exceed the estimated reasonable cost of providing the service for. 
which the fee is charged (emphasis supplied) . 
There is an exception, of course. A question regarding the amount of the fcc 
charged in excess of the estimated reasonable cost of providing the services or 
materials can be authorized by a popular vote of two-thirds of the electors voting on 
the issue. 
It seems likely that processing charges are too high in some Orange County 
jurisdictions. How else, for example, can one explain that a single-family building 
permit in the County of Orange is $447 while the same permit in the city of Buena 
Park is about $1363 or $1469 in Yorba Linda? 
One explanation for such disparities is. the penalty on subdivision housing 
exacted by the Uniform Building Code fee schedule. Under the provisions of the 
code's standard fee schedule, a plan check fee of 50% to 65% of the permit fee cost is 
assessed for each building permitted. The formula is reasonable enough when only 
one house is permitted and one plan check is performed. However, with subdivision 
tract work, the same basic set of plans is used for multiple editions of the same build-
ing. Only architectural. adornments or plotting are changed. 
The County of Orange has taken the leadership to recognize this inequity 
and has reduced charges for both plan check and inspection for multiple editions of 
the same building. 
We urge the BIA to call on local cities to also consider such reforms. 
13. The "Other" Orange County Is Also Making exactions. Local builders 
may find some comfort in knowing that they are not alone in being subject to heavy 
exactions. Some 76 Florida communities reportedly now impose at least one form of 
development impact fee. About one-half of the development projects now under way 
in central Florida are in Orange County. Orlando is the county seat. 
The East Central Florida Regional Planning Council says that impact fees 
add a bout $4550 to the cost of a new house. 
Even law enforcement has been included among impact fees after a court 
challenge. As the fees there now stand, single-family homes pay about $50 per unit, 
commercial space about $140 per 1000 square feet and factory and warehouse space 
about $8 per 1000 square feet. 
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Other Orlando fees of interest to our members are for transportation impacts 
at $1060 per home. Fire impact fees are based upon five different degrees of fire 
risk for the structure in question. Unincorporated Orange County, California 
developers now pay a fire facility fee of S52 to $346 per home. 
We don't defend those fees just because they are used elsewhere. Any 
jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction analysis, however, should look at the entire revenue 
source spectrum including property, income, and sales taxes, the level of builder-
installed capital facilities, and the bonding authority of regulating public agencies. 
14. School Fees Are In Need of Reform. It goes without saying that school 
districts -- even with declining enrollments -- wasted little time in exacting new fees 
of $1.50 per square foot of residential construction for new school facilities. When 
added to the exactions of other agencies, the cost of one building permit has now 
gone over $10,000 in many jurisdictions. 
Reforms are under way at this wrttmg in Sacramento to limit such fees to 
the districts for which they were intended -- the fast growth districts with increasing, 
not decreasing enrollment. 
Conclusion. The land development fee survey should be an annual project 
of the Building Industry Association. Keeping the BIA's fee library up-to-date will be 
an easier task with the computerized data base we are preparing with this study and 
with the reforms made in data gathering. We will be glad to help with errata sheets 
should our readers discover any gremlins among the numbers. 
We also recommend a set of principles, The Fair Share Principles, if you will, 
to help guide agencies in setting and updating fees (see Appendix "G"). 
·Finally, a research check list is included to help builders, developers and 
their consultants get the right numbers at city hall. 
Very truly yours, 
PREVIEW REAL ESTATE SERVICES 
~\h~\ S{'cocJ(\1\ 
Philip Bettencourt 
Consultant 
PB/lt 
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THE FAIR SHARE PRINCIPLES 
1. Notice. Provide sixty (60) days notice of the effective date of any fee increases 
2. Public Hearing. Publish notice and hold hearing prior to consideration of fcc 
increase along with mailed notice to any petitioning party pursuant to Section 
54992 of the Government Code. 
3. Resolutions. Do not amend enabling resolutions. Work for the inclusion of all 
development fees in one new, comprchensive.resolution. 
4. Volume Adjustment. Adopt reduced rates for subsequent plan check and inspec-
tion of identical buildings. 
5. Source Documents. Insure that the actual fee authorization document with of-
ficial Council signature is available for distribution by development services 
agency or city clerk upon request. 
6. Other Agencies. Publish, and clearly display, contact list of any other known 
agency that may claim regulatory jurisdiction. 
7. Payment Timing. Honor deferred payment rules under recent state legislation 
(AB-3314), Government Code Section 53077.5. 
8. Establish Specific Benefit Areas. Assessment fees shall be within clearly 
defined bOundaries for benefited properties and shall not be utilized to sub-
sidize other tax-supported facilities or services. An adopted plan of wor'ks & 
implementation schedule shall be in place prior to collection of fees. 
9. Documents Kept Current. Cost-of-living increases shall be documented in newly · 
published schedules. No undisclosed, intermediate calculations shall be required 
to determine one's probable liability. 
10. School Fees. School fees shall only be implemented with a school facilities 
master plan, adopted budget, and specific spending plans adopted after public 
hearing. 
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Let me begin by thanking the Joint Legislative Budget Committee for 
providing me with this opportunity to discuss "Proposition 13, Ten Years 
Later". As some may know, I have had the opportunity to participate in vari-
ous aspects of the "constitutional tax/spending limitation" movement for some 
15 years. 
By one measure, the Committe~'s willingness to give attention to this 
subject today may be deemed somewhat premature. Various entities seem to be 
working up to a "ten-year retrospective" of Proposition 13 -- which would 
postpone such attention to next summer. 
By another measure, the Committee's willingness is timely. The FRBSF 
Weekly Letter recently focused on "Prop. 13 Nine Years Later~. Paul Gann has 
promised support for certain modifications in both Propositions 13 and 4. The 
State Superintendent of Public Instruction, Bill Honig, has promised to lead a 
fight to amend Prop 4. 
I will not dwell long on the history. Prop 13 amended the California 
Constitution in June 1978 to provide specific limitations on local property 
taxes. Prop 4 amended the California Constitution in November 1979 to provide 
spending caps for (virtually) every unit of California state and local govern-
ment . Their passage may be seen as the culmination of a "taxpayer revolt" 
building since the late 1960s when Los Angeles County Assessor Philip Watson 
sponsored the first of several unsuccessful "Watson" initiatives. 
The central theme of this "revolt" was that elected representatives were 
approving more spending and more taxes than the body politic was prepared to 
tolerate. It reflects the central fiscal problem faced by any democratic 
society, that of finding a balance between private and public spending reason-
ably tolerable to the body politic. It reflects the conflict inherent in the 
fact that what people in the aggregate seek to spend through government far 
exceeds what people in the aggregate are prepared to finance through taxes. 
- 1 -
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The story is simply told. In the ear y 1960s, California state and 
local government. taxes amounted to 11.3% of California State Personal Income 
(SPI). By 1978, this share had risen to 15.4% and the trend showed no sign of 
abating -- in spite of nearly universal pleas to state legislators to take 
action to stem the rising burden. 
Somewhat ironically, given the focus of Prop 13, the burden of property 
taxes in 1978 substantially was the same as it had been 10 years earlier. By 
contrast, other state and local taxes had been rising dramatically, moving 
from 5.7% of SPI in 1961 to 9.2% in 1978. 
In no small part, the effort to enact Prop 4 was prompted by a desire to 
avert even greater increases in income and sales taxes by a Legislature seek-
ing to recover the tax revenues lost by the popular adoption of Prop 13. 
Based on the period 1981-85, this effort appears to have been successful: the 
share of SPI consumed by non-property taxes has floated in the 8-8.7% range. 
Meanwhile, the property tax share of SPI has floated in the 2.8-3% range. 
These two propositions, both adopted by overwhelming majorities, differ 
in their affinities and procedures. Prop 13 has an affinity for the several 
Watson initiatives in imposing tax rate limitations and leaving to governments 
the right to spend whatever they can collect within those rates. Prop 4 has 
an affi'nity for then-Governor Reagan's ill-fated Prop 1 initiative of 1973 in 
imposing aggregate dollar taxing/spending limitations and leaving to govern-
ments the right to decide how to collect and spend their revenues within 
these limits. The central property tax rate limitation of Prop 13 is adjust-
able only by a new state-wide constitutional referendum; the spending limita-
tions of Prop 4 are adjustable individually by the electorates of their re-
spective governments. 
Impact of Prop 13 
One question which may be posed is whether Prop 13 has had the impacts 
anticipated at the time of its adoption. The answer, I think, clearly is 
"yes". 
As anticipated, the share of state personal income going to property 
taxes has fallen in half, reflecting the maximum 1% property tax rate limita-
tion. 
Perhaps somewhat unexpectedly by some, the new share has been relatively 
stable, reflecting a continuing turnover of property -- and, therefore, con-
tinual replenishment of the property tax base. At the time, some had forecast 
a dramatic reduction in the property turnover rate which, in conjunction with 
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the maximum 2% annual reassessment limitation, would have led to a continuing 
decline in the ratio of assessed valuation to income. 
As anticipated, longer-term property owners pay less, and shorter-term 
property owners pay more, of their incomes in property taxes -- reflecting 
both the reassessment of property to full market value on turnover and the 
maximum 2% annual reassessment limitation on continuously-held property. 
At the time, it seemed reasonable that residential property would turn 
over more frequently than non-residential property, reflecting the longer 
life span of commercial, industrial, and agricultural ownership. Perhaps 
unanticipated is some indication that non-residential property is bearing an 
increasing share of the property tax burden. 
As anticipated, Prop 13 induced a dramatic shift in fiscal responsibil-
ity away from local governments to the State, reflecting the State's rela-
tively greater taxing fl exi bil i ty and pressures on the State to "bai 1 out" 
local governments in an effort to maintain the level of local governmental 
services. As anticipated, Prop 13 induced less reliance on property taxes and 
greater reliance on other taxes, especially income and sales taxes (largely 
levied and collected by the State), and on user fees. It would appear, for 
example, that school district dependency on local property taxes fell from 46% 
of total revenues in 1974 to 22% in 1985, with a commensurate increase in 
State funding of local school districts. 
As anticipated, the proportion of voters favoring (further) reductions 
in government spending has declined and the proportion favoring additional 
spending has increased in the years since 1978. That is, there has been a 
shift in sentiment making further (deep) cuts unlikely to win approval by the 
electorate. This shift in proportions surely represents Prop 13's contribu-
tion to a more tolerable balance between private and public spending in Cali-
fornia, at least as viewed by a majority of the body politic. Life goes on: 
fires are extinguished, criminals incarcerated, schools educate the young, and 
libraries remain open -- if, perhaps, less elaborately than before 1978. 
Prop 13 and the California economy 
At the time, some proponents of Prop 13 had forecast that its adoption 
would strengthen significantly the California economy. It was argued that the 
lower property tax burden would make California differentially attractive as a 
place to work, live, and invest-- creating new jobs and rising incomes. 
Simultaneously, opponents had forecast that the lost property tax revenues 
would cripple government services, making California distinctly less attrac-
tive. 
- 3 -
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Shortly after its adoption, I wrote t hat 11 beyond the t ransitory effects, 
t he impact of the Amendment on the aggregate Californi a economy may turn out 
to be de minimis ... The data seem consistent with t his prediction - - or at 
least not inconsistent. Figure 1, below, depicts t he rat io of Cal i fornia 
state personal income to u. s. state personal income exclusi ve of Cal i fornia. 
FIGURE 1 
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Had Prop 13 had a significant impact on the relati ve attractiveness of 
Cal iforni a vis-a-vis the rest of the country, one would expect this ratio's 
trend line t o have been displaced in the years after 13's adoption. It has 
not been. Indeed, it is 1973 which seems to mark the divide between this 
ratio's dec l ine (before 1973) and its rise (after 1973). Others surely are 
better positioned than I to comment on what transpired in California and the 
United States in that period, some fifteen years ago, to reverse this trend. 
For present purposes, it suffices simply to note that no impact of Prop 13 is 
obviously discernible. 
In any case, it must be remembered t hat the California electorate 
adopted, not one, but two amendments dealing with the burden of Californi a 
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governments: Prop 13 in 1978 and Prop 4 i n 1979. Any attempt to assess the 
impact of one must be prepared to di sentangl e the impact of the other . 
Let me be clear that I am no t suggesti ng here t hat Propositions 13 and 4 
had no impact on life in Cal ifornia. I am suggesting that the i r impact fs 
likely to be "distributional ", rather than "aggregative" . That is, the im-
pacts have to do with the relative distr i bution between private and public 
spending, between those on relatively fi xed incomes and those on rel atively 
variable i ncomes, between those in some i ndustries and those in other in-
dustries . 
California without Prop 13 
A second question which may be posed is what California wou l d have 
looked like without Prop 13. Clearly, t here is no obvious answer . 
Equally clear, however, is the fact that the 1970s inflation had a1tered 
dramat1cally the relationship between property taxes and income for a sig-
nificant portion of California residents . Those on relatively fixed incomes 
were faced with rising property taxes, reflectfng the rising value of their 
pr.operty, and a falling standard of living. 
Absent Prop 13, it seems to me likely that the Legislature would have 
acted to mitigate the property tax drain on fixed-income residents. The 
Legislature would have had several different approaches available to it. 
Which might have been chosen is a speculative exercise. However, I would have 
been · surprised had any Legislative approach presi ded over the dramatic shift 
in fiscal responsibility noted above. 
A somewhat different speculative exercise lies in asking whether, absent 
Prop 13, some variant on Prop 4 would have been adopted. The answer is, I 
think, "yes". The rising burden of income and sales taxation in California 
was meeting i ncreasing resistance from the body pol i tic. I also suspect that, 
had Prop 4 first been adopted, Prop 13 would not have been adopted. Put 
another way, had the California electorate enacted then-Governor Reagan's Prop 
1 of 1973, little enthusiasm subsequently would have been generated also to 
enact Prop 13. Such are the ironies of political life. 
Modifying Prop 13 : Assessments 
Paul Gann has indicated that he woul d support rev1s1on of Prop 13 ' s 
assessed valuation base on "equity" grounds. From t he outset, some have been 
bothered by the apparent ''inequity" i n havi ng occupan t s of "identical " homes 
pay dramatically different property taxes . A simpl e example will illustrate. 
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Assume the 1975 value on each of two identical houses was $60,000. Ten years 
go by and the houses remain identical except that House 1 has been sold in the 
tenth year for $110,000, a compound annual growth rate of 6.5 percent. At the 
new cash value, House 1 owner pays $1100 in property taxes. Meanwhile, House 
2 now carries an assessed value of $73,000, reflecting the maximum 2~ annual 
reassessment rate, and its owner pays $730 in property taxes. 
Paul Gann's solution is to have all (residential) property assessed at 
its 1975 market value, adjusted for improvements which, themselves, would be 
assessed as if those improvements had been in place in 1975. Others presum-
ably would .favor annual reassessment of all property at its current full 
market value. Still others presumably would favor assessing residential 
property at 1975 market value and non-residential property at current market 
value. 
Each of these approaches would deal with the apparent "inequity", but 
with very different implications for property values and for property tax 
revenues. The 'Gann approach would benefit current property owners by the 
capitalized stream of reduced future property taxes and would further restrict 
property tax revenues. Surely this would yield a declining share of state 
personal income going to property taxes over time and would produce further 
erosion of local control. The second approach, absent any downward adj~stment 
in the 1~ tax rate limitation, would harm current property owners by the 
capitalized stream· of increased future property taxes and would produce a 
dramatic increase in local property tax revenues. The third approach would 
benefit residential property owners and harm non-~esident~al owners, with 
aggregate property tax revenues falling .som~where between the first two. 
However, no modification is necessary. The current system is ·without . 
"inequity" -- at least in this di'mension. Indeed, the one element of "genius" 
in Prop 13 is the 2~ maximum annual reassessment coupled with reassessment to 
full market value on turnover. That this leads to very different property tax 
payments, depending on the date of last turnover, does not mean different 
burdens of ownership. 
To see this, one merely has to ·answer .the following question: if the 
property in the example above sold for $110,000 when taxed at $1100 per year, 
would it also sell for $110,000 when taxed at $730 per year? Surely, the 
answer is "no.H . The lower the rate at which property is taxed, the higher the 
price pai~ to acquire the property. Thus, adoption of the Gann approach 
merely would mean that new property owners would pay higher prices to acquire 
property and lower property taxes. Put another way, what people would save in 
lower property taxes they would lose in the higher mortgage payments necessary 
to finance the higher market values of property. 
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The drafters of Prop 13 had a choice to make. Property could be held 
forever at its (imputed),1975 market, adjusted annually at a maximum 2% or 
property could be assessed at its current market value. If the first, 1978 
property owners would be the beneficiaries for all time, capitalizing the 
lower property tax burden into the selling price of the property; new owners 
would share in none of these benefits. If the latter, a renewal of the unan-
ticipated inflation of the 1970s again would distort the relationship between 
property tax and income. · 
In drafting Prop 13 to provide for reassessment to full market value on 
turnover, its authors on the one hand precluded 1978 property owners from full 
capitalization of the lower property tax burden implicit in the maximum 2% 
annual reassessment rate. To benefit from this reduction over time, 1978 
property owners must continue their ownership of the property. On the other 
hand, its authors both assured new property owners of a known stream of prop-
erty tax payments on which to base the i r purchase of property (by the 1%-2% 
provisions) and assured a continui ng replenishment of the local property tax 
base (by the full market value reassessment provision). This I would regard 
as an inspired bit of drafting -- and not one to be modified • 
• 
Modifying Prop 13: .Apportionment 
A very different and very real Prop 13 problem has emerged from its 
legislative implementation. In the summer of 1978, the Legislature faced 
apportioning local property tax revenues "according to law... It chose to do 
so essentially by maintaining each jurisdiction's share of the property tax 
11 pie 11 • Thus, a city which had generated 10% of aggregate city property taxes 
before 1978 received 10% of the (reduced) city property tax pie after 1978 
a 11 proportionate sharing of the burden .. ·concept. 
In doing so, 'the Legislature rejected the alternative of apportioning 
the city property tax pie proportional to assessed valuation. In consequence 
of this decision, the Legislature appears to have violated and to be violating 
another California constitutional provision oh "tax situs... In essence, 
residents of cities which levied below average property taxes prior to adop-
tion of Prop 13 now are subsidizing residents of cities which levied above 
average property taxes. There are millions of misapportioned dollars annually 
involved in the Legislature's unconstitutional implementation of Prop 13. 
This matter appears headed for the California courts -- unless the Legislature 
now chooses to adopt an apportionment formula consistent with all parts of the 
California constitution. 
It should be understood clearly that rectification here involves no 
change in Prop 13 itself, only in its legislative or statutory implementation. 
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Modifying Prop 13: Local Control 
There appears to be little enthusiasm to change the basic thrust of Prop 
13 in spite of general enthusiasm for local control of local government and 
in spite of the subsequent adoption of the Prop 4 spending limits. 
Prop 13 fundamentally altered the ability of local governments to seek a 
tolerable balance between their electorates• demands for local government 
services and their demands for lower taxes. Prior to 1978, the local property 
tax was the principal balancing vehicle. Communities, such as Claremont, 
seeking relatively elaborate local services routinely approved higher property 
tax rates. The wide spread between the lowest and highest property tax rate 
jurisdictions prior to 1978 provided eloquent testimony to the diversity among 
communities, both in the mix of taxable resources and in the level of govern-
ment services sought by and provided to residents. 
The time may come when a reassertion of local control is appropriate. 
Any one of a number of approaches may be taken. One would be the simple 
expedient of permitting local units of government to exceed the 1~ rate limi-
tation, with referendum approval by the relevant electorate, either by simple 
or qualified majorities. While this would diminish in no small degree the 
11 security 11 of Prop 13, 'it also would revitalize the spirit of local government 
diversity. 
Another would be, what I have called, 11 Coordinated tax base sharing .. 
(and what some may recognize as a variant of 11 power equalfzing 11 )J permitting a 
relative equalizat~on of the prices 1 of public services among fiscal jutisdic-
tions and leaving to the electorate of each jurisdiction the freedom to deter-
mine the quantity of public services to purchases at these equalized prices. 
Equal prices would translate into unequal property tax burdens, with the 
Claremonters of th.e state bearing a higher burden proportional to the higher 
level of public services provided to them-- just as the equal prices of milk 
and clothing translate into unequal expenditures among households in response 
to differing tastes for privately purchased goods and services. 
Still another would be permission for any local government, again with 
local referendum approval, to add a percentage income tax surcharge on returns 
filed by residents of the locality. As with the property tax, this could be 
introduced in conjunction with 11 Coordinated tax base sharing ... 
This sampling of approaches is not meant to be inclusive. When, and if, 
the time comes, the full range of alternatives can be subjected to careful and 
full consideration. The point here is that modification of Prop 13 in this 
direction may be in order • . By contrast, the modifications which have-occupied 
attention to this point have little justification • 
. - 8 -
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State "Bailouts" 
One final issue perhaps deserves some consideration. In the aftermath 
of Prop 13's adoption, the State utilized its revenue sources to offset in 
part the lost local property tax revenues. Over time, these so-called "bail-
out" monies have represented a decreasing share of local government revenues. 
On this ground, the case for their continuation has been deteriorating. 
However, this issue is anything but simple. These bailout monies have 
come to be woven into the fabric of California governmental finances. In the 
aftermath of Prop 13's adoption, the State took on increased responsibility 
for local school financing and representing, itself, a form of "bailout" --
though one likely to be overlooked. The State currently is at its Prop 4 
"Gann limit". Termination of the 11 bailouts 11 would not augment the State's 
ability to fund state-wide services. At the same time, their termination 
would leave local governments with room in their Gann limits. In consequence, 
termination of the bailout monies would lead either to lower State taxes (at 
the cost of lower local government services or higher local taxes) or to 
increased subventions by the State to local school districts (enhancing school 
finances at 1the cost of reduced county and city government services or higher 
county and city ta~es). 
Whether either result represents a wise exe~cise of Legislative power is 
beyond the scope of today's testimony. 
Conclusion 
The adoption of Prop 13 has generated significant and lasting changes. 
Certain of its attributes can be treated in relative isolation. Others must 
be treate4 in the context of the whole of intergovernmental fiscal relation-
ships, including Prop 4. If Prop 13 came to be viewed as the only vehicle for 
mitigating the distorting effects of the 1970s ' inflation, it became so only 
because the Legislature found itself unable to enact a more constructive and 
less convulsing alternative. Such alternatives cl'early were available. On 
balance, the loss of local control of local government should temper enthusi-
asm for the lower tax burden engendered by Prop 13. Whether ten years after 
is the time to reconstruct California's intergovernmental relationships re-
mains to be 'seen. 
- 9 -
Page 47 stubblebine 
PropositiQn 1~: · A De cade Later 
• I ,, ia.,,jl , 4,' ·~ ; • 
,. . . ' . : .. ' I " •. ~ 
A Presentation t o t he 
Joint Legislative Budget Commi t tee 
"""· ,· by 
Larry J. Kimbell 
Director, UCLA Business Forecasting Project 
and 
Professor of Business Economics 
John E. Anderson Graduate School of Management 
University of California , Los Angel es 
City of Irvi ne Coun cil Chambers 
September 30, 1987 
Page 49 - - Ki mbell 
Proposition 13: A Decade Later 
In May 1978, David Shulman, Robert M. Williams and I 
predicted that Proposition 13 would have a variety of impacts 
on the economy of the state of California. This is a brief 
review of how I perceive what actually happened compared with 
what we predicted. 
(1) We predicted that the reduction of property taxes 
would raise the incomes of property owners and reduce the 
revenues of local governments, but that there would be a net 
loss to the state from the reduction of personal and 
corporate deductions on federal personal income and corporate 
tax returns. The Congressional Budget Office estimated that 
the direct effects of Proposition 13 on Federal government 
revenues would be gains of $1.028 billion in federal fiscal 
year 1979 and $1. 311 billion in 1980. Indirect effects 
tended to reduce this effect, with estimates of gains of $628 
million and $911 million for the two fiscal years, 
respectively. 
I conclude that we were 
Proposition 13 cost California 
higher federal taxes. 
essentially correct that 
taxpayers as a result of 
(2) We predicted that the substantial drop in tax 
revenues would not be offset by increased taxes from other 
sources, and that therefore there would be a sudden and 
substantial drop in state and local government employment. 
The timing of our estimated impacts were very seriously 
wrong. The large state surplus, in addition to cash buffers 
at the local government ~~ve~, meant that there was a shift 
in taxes away from p·roperty taxes to previously collected 
state revenues in excess of amounts that were spent. Notice 
that this effect held only for a transition period. 
We were very seriously wrong in our prediction that the 
unemployment rate would rise substantially (to 9. 9 percent 
versus 6.6 percent without Proposition 13). 
We were essentially correct that the employment in state 
and local governments would be substantially less than 
otherwise, even though we were wrong in the timing of the 
effect. 
Chart 1 shows the actual level of employment in 
California by state and local governments compared with the 
trend projection that can be used as a rough guide to what 
might have taken place without Proposition 13. It is quite 
obvious that 1978 marks a decisive turning point in the rate 
of growth of employment by state and local governments. 
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( 3) We predicted that residential building activity 
would receive a very strong stimulus from the passage of 
Proposition 13, since it concentrated tax relief on property 
taxes. We predicted that in 1980 permits would be issued for 
319 thousand residential housing units if Proposition 13 
passed, but only for 191 thousand units if Proposition 13 did 
not pass. The actual number of permits issued in 1980 was 
148 thousand housing units, less than half of the optimistic 
total we predicted. 
Our prediction was too optimistic but the logic of our 
argument persuades me that Proposition 13 was surely a 
benefit to property owners and would hav.e been apparent in 
the residential building permit data had it not been for the 
surge in inflation and much higher interest rates that 
developed shortly after Proposition 13 passed (unrelated, of 
course). 
We predicted that the impact on total California 
personal income would be significantly more ~ositive than the 
comparable impact on total employmept, s~nce the sector 
receiving the direct benefits, namely, property ownership, is 
very capital intensive and the sector losing revenues, 
namely, the government sector, is relatively labor intensive. 
In that sense, we predicted that Proposition 13 was a choice 
for a substantially smaller government sector, with a larger 
private sector. I conclude that this prediction was 
essentially correct. 
Two critical questions for today are: Is California 
government spending still too high, and is further 
institutional reform needed to hold it in check? Or, is 
government spending too low, and should the legislature be 
permitted more flexibility in making public choices? 
Some voters are undoubtedly willing to see more 
expenditures to combat AIDS, provide more prisons, improve 
highways, raise educational standards and meet other 
perceived needs. Others will prefer to reduce taxes as a 
share of personal income, as the Gann limit tends to imply. 
Democracy is a never-ending search for the optimal balance of 
public and private sector activity. Proposition 13 was 
overwhelmingly approved by the electorate and I believe no 
majority today would vote to repeal it and subsequent fiscal 
initiatives entirely. There may be a growing consensus, 
however, that new flexibility is needed in making rational 
choices about public sector activities. 
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CHIEF BALE: Thank· you. I appreciate that since this trip 
really doesn't pay all that much. 
Honorable Chairman and members of the Joint Legislative Budget 
Committee, I have some prepared comments, and they're very brief. And 
my comments may raise more questions than they answer, but nonetheless, 
I'll do my very best. 
My name is James F. Bale, and I am Chief of Police, City of 
Whittier. I've been in law enforcement for nearly 37 years; Chief in 
the City for 20, as Mr. Campbell has told you. Prior to that I served 
as Chief of Police for the City of Sierra Madre for nearly four years. 
I thank you for the opportunity to testify before this commit-
tee. I hope my remarks will be helpful to you in your decision making 
process. 
I was asked by Chief Gary Tatum of the Vacaville Police Depart-
ment, who's the President of the California Police Chiefs Association, 
to testify on behalf of the Association. This notification came to me 
just last week, and while I solicited comments from some of my col-
leagues as to the effect of Proposition 13 on the operations of their 
departments, I received no replies, which leaves me in a rather precar-
ious ·position of simply stating I guess they're all satisfied. 
I represent a statewide association, and I have no statewide 
data to base my remarks on, so if they're ·a little general in nature, I 
hope you'll forgive that. 
Going back nearly ten years to the· passage of Proposition 13, 
the immediate effect on my own department was to lose five ~worn posi-
tions and two nonsworn positions. That brought my authorized sworn 
personnel to 85. To date, we're still at that complement, ten years 
later. Whittier's a city. of about 75,000 people. 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: Has the population increased during that 
time in the city? 
CHIEF BALE: About 5,000-6,000. My best recollection is a 
number of agencies lost positions at that time. I'm reasonably certain 
that many of the agencies were able to replace some of those positions; 
some may have even increased the complement of sworn and nonsworn per-
sonnel since the passage of Proposition 13. 
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However, to measure the effect of Proposition 13 on law en-
forcement agencies solely on the basis of authorized strength, we may 
be taking entirely too narrow a view. While I realize that manpower is 
important in measuring the impact of Proposition 13 on police depart-
ments, perhaps it's prudent to measure the ability of police agencies 
to impact crime. That does not necessarily necessitate an increase in 
manpower; however, in some cases that may be appropriate. 
It is also my impression that most police agencies in the State 
of California are very well managed and very innovative. I have had 
the opportunity to serve in departments in two other states, so I per-
haps am somewhat qualified to make that comparison. I think they do it 
better in California. 
Perhaps the passage of Prop. 13 may have caused some of us to 
become more innovative since about that time, we were experience in-
creases in crime and other requests for police services. So, we found 
ourselves with fewer people and more things to do. 
We also found that adding personnel to match the increased 
workload was not always a viable solution or alternative because of 
budgetary constraints. That meant that we in effect had to do more 
with less . resources. It was not uncommon at that time, and there's 
still a carry-over to the present time, to find departments rearranging 
their organizations rather ingeniously at times to meet the varied 
needs of the delivery of law enforcement services to the people of our 
communities. In other words, _we had to then and still do rearrange the 
parts within the department to respond to both crime and calls for 
services. 
About 70 percent of what police departments do in communities 
is not crime-related. It's other kinds of services that we produce. 
So, you could say safely approximately 30-40 percent where they have 
catchers and investigators, and the rest of the time we're performing 
noncriminal kind .of activities: taking care bf the sick and needy, 
looking for lost persons, investigating traffic accidents, and doing 
things which are not truly criminal ·in nature. 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: Chief, as I recall, 911 came into existence 
in the last ten years really; hasn't it? 
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Has that increased t h e workload? Do you get a lot more calls 
that are un-police-related as a result of 911? 
CHIEF BALE: Our experience has been that we do not . In fact, 
it's cleaned it up rather well once the people kind of got used to it, 
in that they put the emergency calls for service crimes in progress, 
injury traffic accidents, and a danger to 
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our citizens -- on t he 911, and other things come in on business lines. 
So, it's really worked out quite well for us. We still have some slop 
over from one to the other, but people are pretty good at adopting to 
that. 
In addition to our crime call for services, at the same time we 
had to then, and even more accentuated now, make an attempt to be pro-
active in meeting law enforcement needs . This would lie largely in the 
area of crime prevention. 
Perhaps going back to before Prop. 13, and certainly including 
the past ten years that Prop. 13 has been in effect, technology has 
played a great part in increasing the effectiveness of law enforcement 
in the State of California. My empirical observations would lead me to 
believe that Proposition 13 has not negatively impacted the ability of 
agencies to reasonably avail themselves of current technology, which 
can in some cases preclude the need for additional personnel. 
I think in looking back in the history of law enforcement for 
quite some period of time, our first attempt to better utilize sworn 
personnel, which are very expensive budget items, I might add, was to 
civilianize what positions we could. And then beyond civilianization 
of police agencies, technology seemed to step up and aid us even more. 
If I seem to heavily stress the personnel aspect of law en-
forcement, I think it's with some justification. Personnel items are 
the most expensive items in any police budget, and an examination of 
typical budgets -- I guess there are always exceptions -- by in the 
typical police budget, anywhere from 80-90 percent of the total budget 
goes to the human element within law enforcement: salaries and bene-
fits. The remainder to capital improvements and operational costs. 
So, when you're talking people, you're talking big dollars. 
It ' s extremely difficult to judge the effect of Proposition 13 
on police agencies in the State of Cal i fornia with any authority since 
there are so many factors to consider. And the beginning of Prop. 13 
was just one factor. There were a whole lot of other social factors 
that enter into the changing style and needs for various amounts of law 
enforcement. One might examine, for example, staffing patterns within 
an agency. 
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By the way , there is no standard -- well, let me back track 
just a second. Police employees , the strength of a police department 
is based nationally through the FBI Uniform Crime Reports as the number 
of police personnel, that's sworn and civilian, for each 1,000 citi-
zens. And that will vary all the way from .7 to 6.5 and perhaps even 7 
in some cases, then of course everythi ng in between. I would not be 
too far off if I were to tell you, for example, that in Los Angeles 
County, the number of police employees per 1,000 of population is about 
2.5-2.6; the City of Los Angeles may r un as high as 3.5, which I might 
add is extremely low for a large city. I believe Washington, D.c., has 
about 6.5. 
So, there's no formula that tells you that if you X number of 
police personnel per 1,000 of population, all folks will live happily 
ever after. It depends on the type of community; it depends on its 
location with relationship to a large metropolitan area, for example. 
So, staffing patterns is a rather nebulous thing, and we all measure 
them, and either pat ourselves on the back or moan in despair, but 
there really is no great magic in terms of the number of police people 
that you have. 
However, we do look at staffing patterns, levels of supervision 
of those field forces. Our support groups, scientific ·forensic 
science, .fingerprinting experts, and so on, and response time in re-
sponding to emergency situations is one of the measurements that we do 
look at very closely. The degree of expertise in the area of crime 
analysis, which can often predict future crime events and trends. The 
degree to which an agency participates in ~rime prevention community 
relations activities and, certainly, crime rates, arrest rates, acci-
dent rates, and the ability of the agency to present prosecutable cases 
to the district attorneys offices. 
Perhaps the most difficult element to identify is community 
overall acceptance of the level of law enforcement service that it 
receives from its law enforcement agency. Perhaps, and again there's 
nothing scientific about it , but perhaps t~is can be somewhat measured 
by the number of citizen complaints, observations by our supervisory 
personnel, the degree of involvement by the community with the law 
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enforcement agency in its crime prevention efforts. And these are just 
to measure a few. 
Attorney General John Van Oe Camp has r~cently released a pub-
lication which comes out annua~ly in the State. It's titled "Crime and 
Delinquency in California", and then for whatever year that happens to 
be. This is an excellent report, and while I won't take the time to 
cover each aspect of the report, I would draw your attention to several 
factors -which may point to the effect of Prop. 13 on police departments 
in California. 
Page 120 of that report states that law enforcement agency 
personnel increased by 10.3 percent from the years 1981 through 1986, 
and that would be maybe roughly half of the time that Prop. 13 has been 
in effect. 
What I don't have available is the lost of personnel that may 
have occurred with the advent of Prop. 13 and when that took effect. 
The 10.3 percent increase may represent .an increase in personnel, or it 
may have just brought the agencies back up to the strength that they 
experienced prior to the institution of Proposition 13. 
Page 118 of that report states that law enforcement agency 
expenditures increased 62 percent during the same period. Once again, 
I don't have available to me any population increases that may have 
occurred which may have dramatically increased the need for more police 
services, or any decreases should they have a negative population 
count. So, I don't have any figures to show what the fluctuations 
might have been during that period. 
During that same period, there was a reduction in the Ca1ifor-
· nia Crime Index. That is, the number of Part 1 crimes that occurred. 
We measure Part 1 crimes; it's measured nationally so that everybody's 
playing off the same sheet of music. That is: murder, rape, robbery, 
aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and added to that several years 
ago was the crime of arson. 
We had decreases in the Crime Index, which would be those seven 
offenses that I listed, for 1981, 1 82 and 1 83, which obviously falls in 
the same ten-year period that we're looking at. 1984 remained rela-
tively stable; however, there was an increase in the Crime Index in 
'85-86. We experienced a 7.5 statewide increase in crime. The five-
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year period from 1981-1986 produced a 10.2 percent overall -- that 
five-year period -- produced a 10.2 percent decrease in reported of-
fenses. During the same years, arrest rates went up slightly, about 
one percent or perhaps a little bit more. 
There was a rather dramatic increase from 1977-1981. I don't 
have those figures with me today, but that's when the United States was 
experiencing a tremendous spiral of crime, and thank God it's leveled 
off during the '80s. 
It looks like we're heading up again, so, we're going to have 
to reorganize. 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: What areas, Chief, are they mostly? It is 
burglary, robbery? 
CHIEF BALE: Primarily in burglary, residential burglary. 
Perhaps through Neighborhood Watch wa~ an extremely effective -- if you 
all don't belong to it, you must sign up for your Neighborhood Watch 
program before you leave today. It's one of the most effective crime 
prevention programs. 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: They won't be allowed out of the Council 
Chambers unless they do, Chief. 
CHIEF BALE: Yes, residential burglary, and of course the last 
two years has seen a phenomenal, unexplainable increase in auto thefts, 
just epidemic proportions. 
The figures cited are a small portion of Attorney General Van 
De Camp's overall report, but in fear of losing the thrust of this 
discussion in statistical analysis, I'll make no further reference to 
the report. 
While I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you regarding 
the effects of Prop. 13, it would seem, in all fairness, one must look 
at the overall municipal budget, not just police budgets, but the over-
all municipal budget to more accurately begin a sense of impact, if 
any, that may have occurred. This seems necessary since budgets are 
set by city councils which may have found it necessary in some cases to 
take away from other city services to support the level of law enforce-
ment they were experiencing prior to the passage of Prop. 13. 
I feel safe in saying that most if not all communities place 
public safety, police and fire, highest on the list of public services 
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and probably made very impact to lessen the impact of Prop. 13 on po-
lice and fire. Again there are exceptions, but I think generally 
that's what they tried to do. 
While I'm obviously only responsible for budgeting within the 
police department, I am in my community involved in the overall budget-
ing process for the City. And it seems to me that perhaps more, or at 
least as much, consideration might be given to Proposition 4, which 
impacts the ability of the City of expend funds it already has. 
I do not propose or choose not to entertain any questions re-
garding Proposition 4 since our City Comptroller can barely explain to 
me. 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: Chief, that's the most honest statement by 
anybody before a committee. Everybody has difficulty understanding 
what the Gann limit is. 
CHIEF BALE: The formulas are very difficult. 
Perhaps a collateral issue involves the assistance given to 
cities by the State, sometimes referred to, and in my estimation rather 
obnoxiously, as bailout. I don't wish to belabor the term, but it 
seems to me that term connotes that a city has done something wrong or 
improper, or that it may even been a handout. And it seems to me those 
are our tax dollars which are sent to the State for supporting the 
State government and for safe keeping in the event the State does not 
need all of the money to execute its programs. It seems just and help-
ful to return at least some of those funds to the smaller units of 
government which do not have the ability to tax, or limited ability to 
raise funds from other sources. 
Not having had the ability to survey California law enforcement 
agencies, in summary it's my feeling that Proposition 13 had a negative 
effect on law enforcement at the time of its inception, but has not 
proven to be devastating in its effect, overall effect, on law enforce-
ment, at least at this time. 
The people of the State of California spoke loudly and clearly 
in supporting Proposition 13. They wanted to reduce the amount of tax 
levied by the government on their property, and I fully support their 
position. 
Page 60 -- Bale 
However, it may not have been altogether fair on the part of 
the public to expect a reduction in taxes and a continuation and in 
some cases increases in municipal services. 
I thank you for the opportunity to testify before this impor-
tant body, and I will be pleased to answer any questions that I may 
feel qualified to answer. 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: Any questions? 
Chief Bale, thank you very much. You should understand that 
everybody wants to lower taxes and increase services. That's the his-
torical mode of what people prefer to do. 
' 
CHIEF BALE: It's a nice trick if you can do it. 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: Yes. 
Thank you, Chief, for coming down here today. 
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-"PROPOSITION 13, TEN YEARS LATER" 
PREPARED FOR JOINT LEGISLATIVE BUDGET COMMI TTEE 
SEPTEMBER 30, 1987 
Information oreoared for Fire Chief John Englund. representing 
the Consolidated Fire Protection District of Los Angeles Countv 
and t he Fire Districts' Association of California. for 
oresentation . to the Joint Legislative B~dget Committee. 
I. INTROQUCTION 
Pursuant to the Fire Protection District Law of 1961. 
fire districts were created for public health. safetv. 
and welfare. The districts provide these services. which 
include but are not limited to: 
fire suppression 
- oaramedic services 
- hazardous materials services 
disaster preparedness 
cublic education 
rescue services 
fire prevention 
These services are all aopropriate functions of a fire 
district. 
Fire districts orovide highlv cost effective fire 
protection and ·other emergency services to large areas 
resulting in substantial savings to the public. Such 
savings are the result of a district's abilitY to orovide 
service to its jurisdiction on a regional concept basis. 
Currently. fire districts• revenue has not keot oace with 
copulation growth and service demand increases. therebv 
limiting fire districts' ability to maintain level of 
services without curtailments. 
-1 -
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II. ANTICIPATED IMPACT OF PROPOSITION 13 
I I I. 
In 1978 the Los Angeles Countv Fire Department prepared a 
plan~ as did most taxing ag~ncies in California. which 
was to be implemented in the event Proposition 13 
passed. That plan provided for an approximate 2/3's 
reduction in Los A~geles Cou nty Fire Department 
operations. 
At the time Proposition 13 passed, the L.A. County Fire 
Department was comprised of two legally separate 
entities: the Fire Protection Districts of L.A. Countv 
(special districts> and the Forester and Fire Warden (a 
Countv General Fund department>. The anticipated budget 
impact was as follows. 
Anticip• t • d Bud;• t R•ducticn -
The Department analysis of Proposition 13 indicated that 
if passed, our budgets would be reduced from: 
Districts 
F&cFW 
From $61~441,839 
From $19,654,855 
To: 17,818,148 <-71/.) 
To: 8,255,039 <-58/.) 
Other fire districts had similar plans with similar 
effects. 
Legislative action in the form of first year bailout and 
sub s equent property tax redistributio~ prevented drastic 
r.equ~tiQns frqf!l Qe<:currtng and mitigated much of the impact 
of P~oposition 13. 
LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANCE ( 11 8AILOUT 11 ) 
To assist local governments in dealing with Proposition 13. 
the Legislature enacted Senate Bill 154 <Chapter 292~ 
Statutes of 1978> which. for one vear onlv. provided block 
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grants of $811~000,000 to ensure that local governments 
would not fall below 90% of their 1978 cre-Proc. 13 
budgets. Special districts received $125 million of these 
SB 154 block grants~ which was proportionately distributed. 
based on each county's special districts' croperty tax loss 
in relation to statewide scecial districts' loss. 
SB 154 mandated that fire and police programs in cities ~ 
counties. and special districts be given prioritY in the 
distribution of the appropriations. 
"Funds distributed for this section shall 
be given first for colice and fire pro-
grams in order not to jeopardize the 
health and safety of the community. The 
legislative bodv shall ensure that the 
level of police and fire protection 
programs actually provided in the 1977-78 
fiscal Year shall be continued in 
1978-79." <SB 154~ Chap, 292. Statutes 
of 1978) 
SB 2212 <Chapter 332, Statutes of 1978> made technical 
changes to SB 154; however, it also approcriated an 
additional $37 million to special districts. 
This assistance considerablv lessened the imcact 
Proposition 13 would have had on the f1re districts and 
other fire departments in the State~ including the Fire 
' Protection Districts of Los Angeles County. This is 
evidenced bv a comparison of the property tax levy the 
Fire Protection Districts of L.A. County received in the 
last pre-Prop. 13 year of 1977-78 and the post-Prop. 13 
year of 1978-79. 
TAX LEVY 
$49~825~094 
$23.766~125 
1977-78 
1978-79 
BAILOUT 
-0-
$36~811~116 
TOTAL 
$49,825 , 094 
$60,577.241 
Had the Fire Protection Districts of L.A. County not 
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received these bailout monies . their 1978-79 cropertv tax 
revenu~ would have been 521. l ess than it was in 1977-78. 
Other fire districts excerienced si~ilar circumstances. 
Legislative assistance came in another form in 1979. when 
the Legislat u r e en a cted A8 8 <Chapter 282~ Statutes of 
1979> which redist ri buted th e property tax and created 
the Scecial Di strict Augmen t a tion Fund <SDAF> which was 
intended to provide a long-ter m solution to the funding 
croblems of scecial districts . The State assumed 
responsibili t y for a larger portion of school district 
financing and made a share of the school district 
croperty . tax reven ue available for distribution to 
cities. counties~ and scecial districts. 
Distribution of these additional tax revenues to scecial 
districts through the SDAF was established in AB 8 
<1979). The board of supervisors of each countv was 
given complete discretion in the allocation of the SDAF 
monies . 
Statewide. methods of dist r ib u tion of SDAF monies vary. 
These methods are list~d in order of their frequency of 
use by counties throughout the State; the number of 
counties using this method as of 1985 are in parenthesis. 
Priorities <14) - <Board of supervisors determines 
which services are most important and allocates 
accordingly) 
Need (9) - <Special districts• ann~al needs determine 
allocation> 
Contribution Cb) - CReturn of full contribution to 
source> 
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Formu l a (6) - ( A formula is adhered to for 
allocations> 
Committees <5> - <Committee made up of district 
representatives to decide alloc ations> 
Other or Unknown (18) 
Controversies in several counties have occurred involving 
SOAF policies. some of which have resulted in litigation. 
Some of the major policy disagreements are: 
Allocations are based on political circumstances • 
rather than actual need of fire districts. 
No allocation formula in existence which~ in turn~ 
necessitates staff time to protect or justify 
allocations and results in the inability to do anv 
long-range fiscal planning. 
Emergency reserves retained annually exceed the 1% 
statutory limit. 
Distribution of SOAF monies to newlv created special 
districts that do not contribute to the SOAF have 
reduced SOAF allocations to the remaining fire 
districts. 
Yearlv unallocated emergency reserves which are never 
distributed to the special districts. 
Four modifications t~ the SOAF have occurred since its 
inception: 
AB 934 <1981> A district must be allocated a share of 
-5-
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58 127 (1982> 
HE 3469 <1984> 
H8 1849 (1984> 
~ne Tunc even lT it receives revenue Trom 
assessmen~s. c narges. or soecial ~axes. 
Uo to l'l. of the fund mav be re~aineo bv 
the board of suoervisors for adminis~ra­
tive costs ano l'l. mav be retaineo as an 
emergency fun d for soecial distric~s. 
The emergencv fund could be utilized to 
make loans/grants or oromote consolioa-
tion of districts if the allocating board 
of suoervisors so chooses. 
Indeoendent districts' contributions to 
the SDAF were frozen at their 1983-84 
levels. resulting in their growth being 
returned to t h e district rather than tne 
SDAF . which should eventuallv lessen 
these districts' deoendencv on the SDAF. 
Since its enactment. there have b~en several unsuccessful 
leoislative attemcts to modifv or eliminate the SDAF. 
The leoislative bailout to date has been a catchwork of 
solutions that have not fulfi l led lone-term fundinc 
needs. No comprehensive legislation to date has provided 
a solution that would furnish fire districts with a 
stable source of revenue t6 address growth and service 
demand .needs. 
I V. WHAT FIRE DISTRICTS MIGHT HAVE LOOKED LIKE IF PROPOSITION 
13 HAD NOT PASSED 
Based on our exoerience~ it is reasonable to assume that 
situations similar to that of Los Angeles Countv would 
have occurred in other fire Qistricts. 
-o-
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Prior to the passage of Proposition 13~ property was 
reassessed everv three to five years. The average 
assessed value growth in Los Angeles County was 12.581. 
per vear from 1973 to 1977. After the imPlementation of 
Proposition 13~ growth in assessed valuation slowed to an 
average of 10.6% per vear. 
In an attempt to estimate the financial profile of the 
Consolidated Fire Protection District had Proposition 13 
not been enacted. we applied the pre-Proposition 13 
four-year ave~age ass~ssed value growth rate of 12.581. 
(compounded> to arrive at a projected 1986-87 assessed 
value for the District~ which could be compared to the 
actual 1986-87 District assessed value: 
$89,273.649,128 
$76.059,274,616 
Projected 1986-87 A.V. 
Actual 1986-87 A.V. 
The results show the projected assessed value growth to 
be 17.41. over the actual assessed value growth. 
It could be reasonably assumed that this difference in 
growth is largely the result of Proposition 13's 
reQuirements: 
that property be reassessed onlv when ownershiP 
transfers. and 
a maximum 21. growth factor to be applied to the 
assessed valuation of properties if no transfer of 
ownership has occurred. 
In the period 1978 to 1986. service demand factors 
increased as follows: 
Population served increased bv 20.61. to 2.6 million. 
-7-
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-Total emergency responses i ncr eased by 26.8/. to 
152~~72 incident responses . 
Paramedic/emergency medica l resoonses increased by 
67. 17/. to 12~.361 resoonses. 
Housing units served increased by 16.5/. to 834~316 . 
Cities served increa~ed 12.2/. to 46. 
Had Proposition 13 not passed and the Consolidated Fire 
Protection Distr i ct's last levied tax rate of $.7865 been 
imposed on the projected assessed value~ District 
property tax revenue would have been approximately $175.5 
million based upon recognition of emergency service 
needs. The District's propertv tax revenue would have 
been modified to meet the District's needs which may have 
been lower than $175.5 million but higher than the $147.9 
million budgeted for 1986-87. The District's property 
tax revenue~ including Specia l District Augmentation 
Funds, for Fiscal Year 1986-87 equalled approximately 
$122.9 million~ -OR- 3~/..less than what it could have 
been had Prooosi ti on 13 not oassed· and 2~. 3/. bel ow 
minimum operating requirements ·of the 1986-87 Budget. 
The Consolidated Fire Protection District's ooerating 
requirements include replacement or addition .of emergency 
service assets such as fire s t ations and eouipment and the 
addition of personnel necessary to fulfill its mission. 
These various needs. identified above , are not addressed 
within the current revenue constraints but would have been 
addressed if . Propositi on 13 had . not passed. Other fire 
districts have experienced similar or more adverse 
circ u mstances. 
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V. NEGATivE FJNANCIAL IMPACTS ON FIRE PBQTECTIQN DISTffliCTS 
SINCi THE INCEPIIQN 9E PROPQSITION 13 .. 
B~tin••• lnve ntgry Ex e mption Sybyentigoa 
Business inventory exemption <BIE> subventions were 
repealed in 1984-95 by the Legislature. Although some 
permanent funding was provided to replace these 
subventions, special districts were not treated the same as 
cities and counties. Counties received vehicle license 
fees and accelerated lien date revenues, while cities 
received a subvention and accelerated lien date revenues as 
repla~ement for their BIE subventions. 
Accelerated lien date revenues or as they are also known. 
~uppl~mental ~ell proper~y ta~e~, w~re intended to 
compensate special districts for all of their BIE losses. 
They were, however, . inadequate to fully reimburse losses 
for . ~any fire districts. Some fire districts _with little 
or nq commercial/industrial prop•rty m•v -not have been 
a~vers~ly imp~ct•d by the loss of business invento~y 
exemption - sub~entigns and a few fi~e districts may even 
have enhanced their revenue as • -.result of the acc~l.erated 
lien date revenues. Oefinitiv~ .i~formation on such 
d~~trict~ - is presently not ava~lable~ 
In 19e4-95 the .State made a one-tim~-only s~atewiqe 
appropriation 9f $10 mtllion to compensate non-enterprise 
special ,districts for inadequate accelerated 1 i en date 
revenues •. . In ~ddition, a State · loan was made to sp~cial 
dlst~~cts which was to be repaid oqly if supplement~' 
prop•rty taxes fully _replaced the p~evious BIE subventions. 
Th• Cqnsolidated Fire Protection Di•t~ict of L.A. Countv 
received in 1983-84, S8.1 million ~n BIE subventions and 
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)":'~-L,!.~lr-~ hav_e ... .. c~nt· i n~e~ t ,p recei xe _  these funds anhuall v had 
the business inventorv exemption subventions not been 
repealed. Procedural accounting differences between the 
~ . . 
State and Countv preven~ed the District from recovering the 
entire $8.1 million. 
In 1984-85 the Con so l idated Fi re Protection District 
recovered $6 . 6 million from a combination of $2.3 million 
in supplemental roll proper ty tax.es~ a State 1 can. and a 
State subvention. 
Therefore. in 1984-85 the Con solidated Fire Protection 
District of Los Angeles County incurred a loss of onlv $1.5 
milli o n. The decision rendered regarding the procedural 
acco~nting differ~nces affected only Los Angeles Countv. 
It is uncertain how other fire districts were affected. but 
since the procedural accounting decision applied onlv to 
L.A. Countv. it can be safely assumed that their situation 
for 1984~85 was much better. 
In 1985-86 the Consolidated Fire Protection District 
received $2.2 million in supplemental roll prooertv tax 
revenue against a BIE subvention loss which left us with a 
$5.9 million shortfall. 
For - 1986-87 the Consolidated Fire Protection District's BIE 
subvention loss is estimated at $5 . 9 million and a like 
amount for 1987-88. 
Since the repeal of the BIE subvention in 198~-85 through 
1986-87~ the Consolidated Fire Protection Distric~'s losses 
exceed $13.3 million! 
BIE losses have been incurred by many fire districts. To 
date the fire districts have been unsuccessful in their 
legislative efforts to find a permanent fundina replacement 
for the BIE subventions. 
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Due to the discretion given to boards of supervisors in AB 
8~ most fire . districts receive less revenue than they 
contribute to their Special District Augmentation Fund 
<SDAF>. Los Angeles Countv has been an exception as the 
Consolidated Fire Protection District has benefited from 
the Board of Supervisors allocations of the fund. 
Fire districts in Sacramento and San Diego Counties have 
consolidated as a means of removing themselves from SDAF 
constraints to retain funds that thev would have contri-
buted. Fire districts believe that the abilitv to remove 
themselves from the SDAF constraints bv consolidation is an 
incentive to consolidate. 
S~cramento Countv has initiated litigation to retain the 
consolidated fire districts in SDAF to retain discret1on 
over these funds. If the litigation by Sacramento Countv 
is successful~ fire districts would again be , subject to 
having fire protection funds redirected. Fire districts 
would view this as a disincentive to consolidation and may 
not proceed with beneficial cons9lidations. 
Fair Labor Standards Act 
Fire departments and fire districts throughout the State 
were impacted bv the U.S. Supreme Court ruling on the Fair 
Labor Standards Act <FLSA>. Impo'sing premium overtime pay 
has had. and continues to have~ significant imcact on fire 
district finances. For examole, FLSA exoenditures for 
1986-87 will be aporoximately $5 million for the Los 
Angeles Countv Fire Department. 
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Tax Levy Percentage Adj ustmen t <Factor File> 
In Fisca l Year 1984-85 the Los Angeles County Auditor-
Controller established factor file rates. and tax levv 
revenues were distributed on that basis. The schools 
appealed to the Department of Finance and a decision was 
made bv the Department of Finance which required the 
Auditor-Controller to change the factor file rates in favor 
of the schoo l s. This change took place in 1985-86: 
however , it was retroactive to 1984-85. 
That adjustment reduced the 1985-86 annual income of the 
Consolidated Fire Protection Di~trict bv $4 million and 
required a retroactive payment of $4 million for Fiscal 
Year 1984-85 for a total impac t of $8 million. 
Commynity R•d•velcp mant Aa•n cy Losses 
Fire districts' major funding source is property taxes, and 
the districts require their property tax growth in all 
areas of their districts to continue adequate levels of 
service. The Consolidated Fi r e Protection District 
receives 97.6% of their revenue from this source. 
In Fiscal Year 1986-87, the Consolidated Fire Protection 
District's tax increment passed thr-ough to city communitv 
redevelop ment agencies was estimated to be .8.7 million. 
I ~ ~ 986-87 post ;,Montoya CRA p r oject~ accounted for 9% of 
the District's tax i n c r ement loss. 
Pre-Montova CRA project areas accounted for 91% of the tax 
increment loss in 1986-87. 
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Cumulative losses incurred bv the Consolidated Fire 
Protection District due to the dive~sion of funds to CRA 
oroject areas since 1974-75 is estimated to be $56.8 
mi 11 ion. Other fire districts have also suffered losses. 
but detailed information is limited. 
Revenue from growing areas in other carts of the Consoll-
dated Fire Protection District is being used to suoport 
fire protection resources in CRA project areas that are ~ot 
providing a pass-through of tax increments. 
VI. MODIFICATIONS THAT SHOULD BE MADE TO THE PROpOSITION 
Property taxes should finance propertv-related services. 
Public safetv services should receive priority~ which has 
certainlv been the intent of post-Proposition 13 bail-out 
legislation. 
58 154 stated: 
"(1) In distributing funds to districts 
which provide fire protection services. 
and anv police protection district~ countv 
service area. or community services dis-
trict which orovides police protection 
servi ces•. ex c 1 usi vel v ~ tne governing oodv 
shall provide an amount sufficient to 
ensure that each district maintains the 
same level of orotection as was actuallv 
provided during 1977-78." 
This language was maintained in 58 2212. 
VII. SHOULD THE STATE CONTINUE TO PROVIDE "BAILOUT" FOR LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS?" 
58 154~ 58 2212~ and A8 8 cannot be viewed as permanent 
solutions to fire districts• funding problems. but r~tner 
as interim measures until a sound. permanent funding 
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solution can be found. Fire districts need to be fiscallv 
self-sufficient and not dependent upon seeking annual 
legislative remedies • . 
It is evident from discussions with fire districts 
throughout the State and from documentation provided in 
a publicatiqn from the office of Senator Milton Marks 
entitled . Stepchild of Prooosition 13 (January 25. 1985>~ 
that the Special District Augmentation Fund is not 
working appropriatelv and needs to be eliminated and 
replaced with a permanent~ reliable~ and stable revenue 
source. 
Provide legislation that would mandate Community 
Redevelopment Agencies~ as funds become available~ to 
pass-through tax increments to fire protection districts 
prior to incurring additional indebtedness. 
Legislative action to find a permanent funding 
replac~ment for the business inventory exemption 
subventions is required for a.stable financial outlook 
• 
for fire protection districts~ 
Appropriate the balance remaining from the $21.8 million 
appropriated by AB 1304 <Chapter 107. Statutes of 1985> 
to.soecial districts for supplemental ·roll tax revenue 
shortfalls to replace BIE losses for Fiscal Years 
1985-86 .and 1986-87. 
Enact comprehensive fire service long-term funding 
legislation that would provide a reliable and stable 
revenuE;> source~ thereby eli mi na.ti ng the need for-annual 
legislative action to fund the operation of local fire 
districts. 
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VIEW$ FBOM FtRE PROTECTION DISTRICTS STATEWIDE 
I have received comments from fire districts and fire 
departments which I have included in some of the previous 
observations. Contributing counties were: 
Contra Costa County Fi r e District of Contra Costa Countv 
American River Fire Prot e c tion District of Sacramento 
County 
Orange County Fire Department of Orange County 
- Menlo Park Fire Protection District of San Mateo Countv 
- Ventura Countv Fire Protection District of Ventura 
c;ountv 
- Los Angeles City Fire Department of Los Angeles County 
- and also the Legislative Advocate representing the Fire 
Districts' Assoc iation of California. 
A summarv of their comments follows. 
Symmary gf Commwnt • 
1. That the politics and the redirection of the SDAF have 
led the districts to believe that a phaseout of the 
SDAF and the return of all contributions to their 
source would provide some fiscal stability and enable 
the qistricts to better project their fiscal outlook 
each year. 
2. That legislation is needed mandating all current and 
future CRA projects pass-through to fire districts. as 
agency funds become avai 1 abl e -.- p r-i -o r--t-a- i-n r-u r-r-i-ng 
~dditional indebtedness. 
3. That suoplemental roll revenues were inadequate to 
fullv reolace BIE subvention losses; therefore~ a 
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perma.nent;: r·eve~e sour ce t o replace these 1 osses must 
be provided . 
4. Enact legislation to p~ov i de funding for the transition 
an d operation of a volunteer fire district to a paid 
pro fessional fire district. 
lX. SUMMARy 
The provision of fire protect i on, hazar dous materials ~ and 
rescue services by fire distri cts has proven to be a highly 
efficient and effective form o f rendering service . The 
regional concept of provid i n g service a l low& for the most 
' 
efficient placeme nt of resour c es throughout a district's 
jurisdiction and allows for t h e optimum response regardless 
of jurisdictional boundaries. 
Fire districts throughout the State of California have had 
to fight to protect their funding year after year. 
1973 Statutes, Chapter 358, imposed a maximum tax rate 
limitation for local agencies. 
1978, Proposition 13, imposed a maximum .l% property tax 
revenue limit~tion. 
1979, Art~cle . l3B, .Sec t ions 1-11, imposed ~oca~ 
gov~rnment spending limitations. 
1979 ~tatutes- Chapter 282, created the Special 
District . Augm~ntation Fund which is allocat~d at the 
~ole discretion of the Board of- Supervisors of each 
county. 
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rn analvzing the outcome of Proposition 13 as it relates to 
fire districts, it is important to understand what 
transpired before and after its passage. Prior to the 
passage of Proposition 13 most fire districts had an 
established property tax rate that was applied equally, 
according to value, to all properties • For example. the 
Consolidated Fire Protection District of Los Angeles Count~ 
in 1977-78 levied a tax rate of $.7865 throughout its 
jurisdiction. Fire districts were operating under tax 
limitation legislation at the time Proposition 13 was 
passed which prevented them from levying a tax rate higher 
than what was in place in 1972. 
Legislation implementing Proposition 13 <AB 8, Ghapter 282, 
1979 Statutes> effected a redistrib4tion of available 
property tax revenue in proportion to the amount of revenue 
previously received by a taxing agency in each geographic 
area known as a "tax rate area". This method of 
redistribution resulted in a varying distribution of 
property tax reven~es for fire protection services in each 
tax roate area. For instance, the Consolidated Fire 
Protection District's current portion of the $1 <or 1/.) 
property tax rate varies from $.0.9 to $.50 while the 
.District's average rate is approximately $.17. Due to this · 
varied rate, funding of fire protection services for 
~imilar occupancies in different tax rate 4reas is 
inequitable. This inequity is compounded when a transfer 
of ownership occurs and a prope~ty is reas~essed to current 
market value. 
Th~s ~allocation method of the 1/. maximum proper.ty tax 
revenue was appropriate for immediate implementation of 
Propo~ition 13. however, it is .unsuitable as a 
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-cermanent fundin9 solution for fire protection 
di~tricts. · · I ~uggest that l~gislation be introduced 
Aiving ' tirio~it~ t6 the fun d ing of ' fire districts' 
needs through · tHe reallocat ion of the property tax. 
This reallocation could ·be based on value, square 
footage, fire flow or some other equitable manner of 
funding. 
Allocation ·of the SDAF by the Board of Supervisors , in 
many counties has resulted in fire districts receiving 
less revenue than they contribute to the SDAF. 
Legislative attempts to modify or eliminate the SDAF 
have been unsuccessful so far. ·The elimination of the 
SDAF in addition to a reallocation of the proper~v tax 
would r~sult in much - mer~ ~table funding mechanism for 
fi~e - distrlcts statewide • 
• 
While responsibilities to protect · life and pr.operty 
continue to grow, funding for fire districts is not 
keeping pace. Fire districts require a permanent 
legislative solution to ensure adequate funding of 
services as their responsibilities increase. 
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CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: If we can begin aga i n t h is afternoon, our 
next witness will be Dr. Stanley G. Oswalt . or. Oswal t is t he former 
superintendent of the Rowland Unified School District. He has served 
as a school superintendent for a number of years . He is a specialist 
in school finance and a professional consultant. He has presented 
seminars in school finance across the St ate f or the past ten years, and 
he is presently the State trustee for t he West Covina School District. 
DR. OSWALT: Thank you, Senator Campbell, Senator Beverly, and 
members of the study group. 
I was given five questions to respond to. I'd like to start 
with Number One: Did the Proposition have the impact you thought it 
would? 
very simply, no. I think every school administrator in Cali-
fornia was warned that we'd drop off into the Pacific Ocean and that 
life would end if it passed, and of course, no one knew what the Legis-
lature would do in advance. Sometimes we're not certain after it has 
acted. 
certainly in advance, we did not know that Senate Bill 154 
would be passed, and that gave us back 91 percent of the funds we 
thought we would receive prior to the passage of Proposition 13. 
School boards, I think, and service groups particularly, were 
very critical of school administrators for some period of time after 
the passage of Proposition 13 because they had been told stories of 
doom and gloom, and that did not take place. 
One of the positive aspects i n our school district -- and I 
would clarify that my remarks are my own, are limited to my own experi -
enQe; I do not represent any association of superintendents or other 
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administrators -- the tax rate in our school district was significantly 
reduced, though by 1982-1983, many of us thought that the true impact 
of Proposition 13 had arrived. You'll recall that was the year in 
which we received no inflation allowance whatsoever. In 1983-84, Sen-
ate Bill 813 turned finances around again, and finance for schools has 
been much better since that time. 
I think perhaps the most critical long-range impact of Proposi-
tio.n 13 on schools is currently beinq felt in school housing. There's 
no realistic way to adequately meet the needs in rapidly growing school 
districts for housing stud$nts. I know that you are being bombarded 
related to developer fees and the ability of local districts to impose 
those fees, but I would only caution you that some of us are only sur-
viving because of that if we have major growth going on in our school 
districts. 
I think the current State program of deferred maintenance was 
·probably an outgrowth of Proposition 13. I would just comment that 
that one has also be under discussion. That is extremely valuable, in 
my judgment, . in protecting state assets, your buildings that by and 
l~rge you have funded in State-aided school districts. · 
The second question was: What might California school dis-
tricts have looked like if Proposition 13 had not passed? 
I think it's important to recognize that any answer is pure 
-------sspesu~~~ien~arhaps we would have had more school classrooms~~a"n~d1-----­
teachers that might have lowered class size, since that continues to 
be, I think, a major problem in California. Nationally, as you know, 
we still rank as one of the highest ratios in the United States. 
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I think we might have seen far better maintenance programs to 
protect state investments, because I think this continues to be a major 
problem in California. 
We migpt have seen less money in restricted categoricals and 
more money for school boards to utilize in their own identified pro-
grams for either enrichment, or for vocational education, gifted educa-
tion, or remedial education. Again, we can only speculate. 
Question Number Three: What impact did the Proposition have on 
the school districts in California? 
I think we really have to go behind Proposition 13, back to 
1972-73, when Senate Bill 90 established revenue limits primarily for 
school districts. Those revenue limits were accidental and depended 
primarily on where districts were just prior to 1972-73. So, they were 
not fair in terms of their establishment; they were not corrected by 
the so-called Serrano compliance measures. They were not corrected by 
AB 65, and were locked in by Proposition 13 and all the following fi-
nance bills. 
Certainly Proposition 13 changed the State educational system 
from a shared State and local financial system to a State controlled 
system. I think one could argue whether that's good or bad, and I know 
there are viewpoints on both sides. 
My own belief is that there ought to be State defined measures 
as well as local options, and yet most local options are disappearing 
because, I think, most current studies show that most school districts 
today have only between 1!-3 percent of their total budgets for discre-
tionary expenditures. There's no practical way today for a local board 
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of education to increase funding on an ongoing basis to any kind of 
program within their school district. 
Districts are more and more limited to State established prior-
ities. Either first so-called reform programs with quality indicators 
attached, such as the current legislation out of 813: How many stu-
dents do we have in advanced English courses, advanced math, advanced 
science. The kind of quality indicators that Legislators have asked 
for and Bill Honig has placed into effect. 
While I don't object to quality indicators, because I think as 
we receive more funds we have to be able to identify what's happening 
to that money, it is driving the kinds of instructional programs that 
district must place into effect because you only have funding for those 
programs. 
The other side of that coin, of course, are compensatory pro-
grams, where money is designated to be spent in predetermined ways, 
whether that be federal funding, such as Title 1 from the federal gov-
ernment, or set by school improvement programs money from the State of 
California, those funds basically are restricted and restricted with 
guidelines followed by audits. 
I think one of the very positive aspects of Prop. 13 has been 
that we have become very creative to help resolve the financial crunch. 
We have seen many private foundations created to assist school dis-
t ricts in funtltnq-etther-basic programs or special programs such as 
music, drama, et cetera. 
We have seen a rather significant increase in the number of 
bingo operations. And while I don't believe school districts exist to 
run bingo parlors, let me assure you, if you make $4,000 a week, that's 
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makes a tremendous difference in what you can offer high school stu-
dents at a high school that's running the program. 
Swap meets have become very popular. Again, you can make $1200 
a week; three persons can run it. That's a significant benefit to a 
high school. 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: Are there really some school districts 
making -- actually they're individual schools ; aren't they? 
DR. OSWALT: That is correct. 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: Like individual high schools, as I recall. 
DR. OSWALT: I'm using Rowland High School . They started out 
with 4,000 a week. I think Diamond Bar High School does even better 
than that today. They've taken a lot of our customers. 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: What night of the week do you run your 
game? 
DR. OSWALT: Monday nights. 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: They've got to improve dramatically until 
the NFL comes back on. 
DR. OSWALT: -That's true. That's a bingo game unto itself. 
Swap meets, Nogales High School runs. a $1200 a week swap meet. 
They start lining up on Fridays, and you'll see 30 cars lined up so 
they can get coveted space the next day. They've even worked out a 
reservation system where they pay extra to get certain good slots. 
It's a wonderful program. 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: Who runs this? 
DR. OSWALT: The band parents. 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: The band boosters? 
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DR. OSWALT: That's correct, and other support groups can have 
the program one week per month, and they run it the other three or four 
weeks. 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: In other words, it might be the football 
boosters one week or the basketball. 
DR. OSWALT: That's correct. The band boosters are there for 
the first three weeks, and then other support groups of course can run 
in under their direction the fourth weekend or fifth weekend. 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: How did the band move in and get in such a 
number one position?· 
DR. OSWALT: Because we didn't have a good band, and they had 
t o find a way to fund it so they could buy uniforms. 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: I meant , how did they get in ahead of the 
football boosters? 
DR. OSWALT: Just out of need and creativity, I think. It's an 
interesting P.rogram. Not instructional necessarily, but certainly 
contributes to the instructional program. 
I think another creative · mechanism has ·been the use of certifi-
cates of participation. We don ' t l ike to talk about arbitrage, but it 
is there and very helpful . Developer fees --
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: Stan, I don 't understand the term "certifi-
cate of participation". I understand "arbitrage", but I don't· under-
---s,t-a-nd "certificate of part-.i:cipati hat-wha t you called 
DR. OSWALT: Yes. Certificates of participation are long-range 
anti9ipation notes. They can run up to seven years and are sold by 
school districts to be paid for out of any fund that's available to the 
district. They can be general fund; they can be general fees; they can 
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be money the district may have from site sales; from the using interest 
or even State-granted VEA funds which have been invested and we use the 
interest to pay off certificates of participation. 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: Do most school districts use certificates 
of participation? 
DR. OSWALT: No, I would say only -- relatively few have used 
them. You have to have a means of repaying them over a period of time, 
but again, if you get the money up-front and can invest it, you can 
make more money on the investment than you pay on the interest rate. 
It can be very helpful. I know one district where the business 
manager hopes to make his district something in excess of a million 
dollars over five years. 
Developer fees, of course, have helped us tremendously in rapid 
growth areas, sharing in redevelopment income. I think school dis-
tricts initially were very naive, and were not aware of their impact on 
cities or counties were redevelopment projects went in. we have 
learned that school districts can bring lawsuits; we can stop projects 
and receive income, and that has been one that's still widely under-
used in California but is growing in its impact. 
By the way, there are ways that school districts can partici-
pate and receive funding, and the counties cannot get hurt, because as 
it relates to a fire district, that money can be passed through to the 
extent they would have received the money. 
School business partnerships, of course, have grown widely and 
we've got a great deal of help in those areas. 
Fourth question: Is it time to make any modifications to the 
Proposition? 
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Yes, I believe so. I think there needs to be some way that 
local school boards can raise funding for both facility and general 
fund needs. I think there needs to be a voter approval method of more 
than 50 percent and less than 66-2/3. I think the low-wealth districts 
need to be able to raise as much as wealthy districts for each one cent 
on the tax dollar, which takes us back to the equalization in Serrano 
and so forth. 
I think second, revenues should have a lot of time talking, and 
I do not have a sol ution , but equalize the tax burden on new and old 
home owners. Those tax differences can be as much as four times, as 
represented by my next doo~ neighbor who j~st sold his home, versus 
mine purchased five years ago, and his rates versus mine. so, I have a 
personal interest in that one. 
The last question: Should the state continue to provide bail-
out to local governments? 
I very much appreciated the answer given a few minutes ago. I 
don't like the term "bailout". It connot;.es being saved, and my dis-
tricts have not needed to be saved. 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: But Chief· Bale had a surname problem with 
·bailout also. 
DR. OSWALT: If you define bailout in terms of current prac-
tice, i.e., a bankrupt school district, which~ happen to work in 
a 'e"e "lOan, en s an 
appropriate term and with penalizes , I think it ' s appropriate to be 
certain you get your money back. 
If it's to maintain prog~ams, establish new programs , no, I do 
not think you should be in th~ bailout business in those ar enas . 
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But I think t he quest i on r eally begs the i ssue: How can we 
reach agreement on the level of fund i ng which will, i n most ways, place 
a value on what we want? If we know what our funding level is to be, 
we can adjust the programs. California has lear ning problems that are 
unique to the rest of the United Stat es. How do you compete on a fair 
basis, i.e., class size, support staff, instruct ional supplies and 
equipment, in the United States when we spend far less per pupil? 
It's my feeling however, and it's interesting as I hear others 
testify, all of us want more money, but we want less restrictions, et 
cetera. I think that the problem that's faced -- I'll limit it to the 
public schools -- if you could establish some kind of formula so we 
knew what funding was in advance, when we tell our business community, 
as an example, that as of July, when we start preparing budgets and 
often even into September, that all of our income is predicated by the 
formula coming from the Legislature based upon the estimated number of 
students, who may or may not show up in September, they get a little 
scary in terms of how, then, do you run that kind of enterprise. 
I think the difficulty we have in the public schools is knowing 
how much we will have at a given level of time, then ·we can I get 
carried away when we start talking about reducing budgets, but we know 
how to reduce budgets. We can provide education at any level, but I 
for one, as a long-term superintendent, having been a superintendent 
-for 30 yecrrs-o my- am re of apologizing 
for an outstanding instructional program offered in California schools. 
And I recognize we have many, many critics. I recognize we do not have 
a perfect system. But we have an outstanding instructional program in 
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our public schools in California that ' s better today than it's ever 
been in our entire history. It's demonstrated by many, many measures. 
I'm tired of apologizing for us. Tell us what you want, and 
stop asking for more with less, as for example, 1987-88. I think all 
of us have reduced income related to our expenditure patterns and are 
asked to continue to improve _all quality indicators. 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: I have a couple questions, Stan. 
You said you believe only 3 percent of your budget you really 
have for discretion. Was that the figure that you used? 
DR. OSWA~T: That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: And I gather the State now puts up, what, 
about 90 percent of most school districts' cQsts? 
DR. OSWALT: We would put them at about 88 percent; 85-90 per-
cent. 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: PriQr to 1978, the State's contribution was 
less than 50 percent; wasn't it? 
DR. OSWALT: Statewide in our district, it was very different 
because, as you know, we were then, were ~nd are a low-wealth school 
district. We have always received over 60 percent of our money from 
·the State. But statewide it was somewhere in the neighborhood of ~2 
percent. _ 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: So, what you've had is. a diminution of 
------oetien t the loeal . ~evel for di~~~ionary spendi-~~~~~~~~--­
discretionary programs? 
DR. OSWALT: That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: I guess I think the thing that concerned me 
most was when you said you really couldn't enhance any program that you 
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wanted to because you don ' t have the funds with which to do that, if 
you wanted t o enhance a program or start something d i fferent . 
DR. OSWALT: Let me use just one exampl e, if I may. 
Rowland has a very unique instrumental music program starting 
at the fourth grade level. It's served by t wo traveling mus i c teachers 
in reconstruct ed school buses, where the bus pulls up, plugs into a 
thing, and there's an electric organ and a i r condit ioner on the bus, 
and students come out, have instruction on the bus, and then return to 
the classroom. It keeps the school quiet; offers a ready classroom 
because we are overcrowded, and t hen they move to the next school. 
our Board of Educat ion has looked at, asked for, a string in-
strument program so they can have orchestras. Orchestras are something 
that don't exist in public schools in California today, and yet orches-
tras were a part of all schools when I went to school in the Midwest, 
in the East, and even in the West at one time. Orchestras don't exist 
these days, and I think that ' s too bad. That's a skill that's a life- · 
time skill, and it's very different from, say, football. 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: Thank you very much. I appreciate your 
coming down here today. Try and get West Covina out of the hole. 
DR. OSWALT: I will protect your dollars, believe me. 
Thank you for the opportunity to testify . 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: Thank you. 
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our next witness is Mr. Joe Duardo. Joe is the immediate past 
president of the California School Boards Association. He is also 
presently a member of the South Whittier School District and serves as 
their president. He is a retired engineer from the Xerox Corporation. 
Joe, thank you for being with us today . 
MR. DUARDO: Thank you. Good afternoon Senator Campbell, Sena-
tor Beverly, members of the study group. 
As stated, I'm Joe Duardo, immediate past president of the 
California School Boards Association and a member of the South Whittier 
Elementary School District Board of Trustees for the past 13 years. 
I'm here today to represent the more than 6,000 local elected school 
board members in the State. 
CSBA has a long established finance statement in our legisla-
tive platform calling for reinstitution of local tax levying authority 
for local governing boards. Since the passage of Proposition 13 and 
' 
the demise of authority for local tax overrides, school districts have 
been at the mercy of the Legislature and the administration regardless 
of their community's desire to supplement the funds available for pub-
lic schools. 
In 1977, prior to the passage of Proposition 13, virtually 
every school district in Los Angeles County had revenues generated by 
local tax overrides. These revenues allowed local governing boards to 
better meet the unique needs of their local schools as identified pri-
orities by the community. CSBA and local boards longed for the author-
ity and opportunity to turn to their parents, local businessmen and 
women, and residents to given them the opportunity to make a decision 
Page 91 -- Duardo 
via the e l ectoral process to provide additional dollars for our stu-
dents. 
CSBA urges this committee and the Legislature to consider leg-
islation reauthorizing tax overrides with a majority requirement for 
school districts. We believe that this option would give schools the 
necessary tool to seek additional fund i ng from their own local tax 
base. 
Thank you very much for the opportunity to join you today. 
CSBA would welcome the opportunity to work with you to assure that any 
tax levying authority proposal would be developed in such a manner to 
prevent inequities and yet at the same time, give local communities an 
option for a new funding source. 
Thank you. Those are my prepared comments. 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: I want to ask for some observations on your 
part because you're one of the few school board members, I think, left 
who has served pre-Prop. 13 and post-Prpp. 13, and having a statewide 
understanding. 
What have you seen in your district?. What differences have you 
seen before and after 13? 
MR. DUARDO: My service on the board predates Proposition 13, 
but it doesn ' t go so far back as when we had local tax overrides . So, 
I ' m trying to compile from our district and from other districts in the 
area, Wl. h '"1: some ana 
can be given as an addendum to this testimony. 
However, I would like to comment on the present needs and what 
I can envision t hat might happen should we regain this authority. It's 
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certainly not a scientific calculation of .data, but just knowing what I 
know about schools in our area. 
I would echo Dr. Oswalt's sentiments. It's probably in the 
area of school facilities. We worked very closely with the Governor's 
Office and the Legislature last year to get a package passed, which was 
a bill with $4 million, and it sounded like to may be closer to the 
total solution as we find it. That's not nearly the case. School-age 
population's growing at a rate of about 130,000 students per year, as 
opposed to 100,000 that we had been projecting. 
There's a frustration on behalf of school districts in our area 
because of the fact that all the schools · funded by· the State program 
are already in effect locked up in the log jam of districts that have 
qualified and are in line for those funds and are preventing other 
districts from having any hope for qualifying. 
In our area -- and also part of the school facilities issue 
that we discussed was the fact that he schools were built for a class-
room of 30-40 years ago. The computer labs and interactive videos, 
some of the equipment that we would like to see in the classroom, we · 
are thinking of conv~rting the cafeteria/auditorium combination, we 
call it cafetoriums, into computer labs, and I think that is one area 
that I think the elementary district particularly would like to have 
additional facilities revenue for. 
---- Ttie nlqh sc ool, Wh tt er High School, is in bad shape and 
needs renovation. This comes at a time when our district is making 
cuts. They're making the cuts that they need to make, and they'll 
survive. The housing, again, is something that's put on the back burn-
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er. I just don't see anything in the i mmediate future that would help 
us in that area. 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: Any questions? 
Thank you very much. We appreciate your being here this ·after-
noon. 
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HARRY HUFFORD 
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee--
Thank you for asking me to appear before you to testify on 
the subject of Proposition 13 -- ten years later. As you 
indicated, my experience as the Chief Administrative 
Officer for Los Angeles County gave me a first hand 
perspective on the impact of Proposition 13. Beyond that, 
my education in Political Science and ·Public 
Administration, particularly under Professors John C. 
Bollens and Winston Crouch at UCLA, focused my career 
interest on local government and my professional attention 
on state and local government relationships. 
Over the years since 1953 I have been well aware 
of the fundamental changes affecting the relationships 
between state and local governments in California. 
Most of these changes directly affected school 
districts and county governments, whose function is to 
provide state services at the local level. 
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For structural reasons there have always been 
tensions between the state and the independent local 
government units which implement state mandates, 
particularly counties and · school districts. 
The emotional intensity of these relationships 
has shown itself jn three areas. 
Program issues; 
Financial issues; and 
Political and interpersonal relationships 
betweet;l lo.cal and state government elected and 
appointed officials. 
When I joined county government in 1953, 
state/county legislative relations seemed to focus on only 
a few areas. Welfare was a main issue because of the 
voter approved shift from county to state to county 
administration and the continuing fall-out from the Myrtle 
Williams/George McClain era. The other two main 
legislative issues of the day for counties were roads and 
highways and judicial staffing matters. 
' 
Los Angeles 
County was heavily focused on developing the governmental 
infrastructure to support the post war population growth. 
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The Board of Supervisors had broad 
responsibilities and the authority to make decisions and 
to finance them. The focus of this decision making was 
the annual budget process. In the forum of the public 
budget hearings, which could fill the Board rooms of that 
era, different points of view competed for priority. 
Independent professional staff advocated for the "good of 
the community and the jur~sdiction as a whole." Special 
interest groups advocated for their constituents' unique 
program ne~ds. Taxpayer watchdogs -- responding to the 
lightening rod of the property tax rate -- advocated for 
fiscal constraint. The Boird of Supervisors had to weigh 
all of these competing interests and they had to raise the 
tax revenue to finance their decisions. The state had 
little knowledge of local government~ as a whole and 
little involvement in their day to day operations or on 
their priority setting decisions. 
In the 1960's and early 70's, with the New 
Frontier and War on Poverty initiatives in Washington, and 
with assessment reforms enacted in Sacramento, Los Angeles 
County first experienced inordinate growth in health and 
social services programs and then began to feel the brunt 
of property tax payer resistance to the local cost of 
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financing t hem. By the mid 1970's Los Angeles County 
government's two l egislative objectives were established: 
home owner property tax relief; and 
substantia l increased state funding for 
health, welfare and justice program mandates. 
During this era, the counties' focus on these 
issues in Sacramento and the trans i tion from a part time 
Legislature dependent on the Executive branch for 
information to a full time profess i onally staffed 
Legislature began to build a knowledge base i n 
Sacramento of county program and finance issues. Drawi ng 
on that knowledge base, when the voters a~proved 
Proposition 13 and suddenly state government became ful l y 
responsible for financing all government in California, 
the state was able to respond in a three week period with 
I ' 
SB154, and following that, with AB8. These immediate 
legislative solutions established the stability, direction 
and structure for the state to work with the schools, 
cities and counties to deal with the aftermath of 
I 
Proposition 13 fo~ the next several years. Additionally, 
local special districts became the new local government 
players at the state legislative level. 
Each year since then, individual program and 
fiscal issues have been the focus of detailed attention 
and reform or revision. In program areas affecting 
counties, we saw Medi-Cal reform, the MIA transfer, jail 
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bonds, mental health funding, child abuse legislation, 
and, most recently, state funding of the courts. 
In the strictly fiscal area, steps were taken to 
repeal the deflator, adjust vehicle license fee 
allocations, repeal the business inventory exemption 
subvention, re-allocate property tax revenues and 
re-establish the authority to issue general obligation 
bonds. Most recently, in this session you have created 
block grant funding to counties in addition to state 
financing of the courts, as previously mentioned. 
There will continue to be tension between the 
state and local agencies over funding and program issues 
in education, health services, the homeless, etc. etc. 
But, I see this now as part of the process -- and that the 
issues that are debated are within a framework of 
legislative and policy history that permits resolution 
(not necessarily tidy) of the issues. 
Having said this, what can I suggest to you for 
your further consideration? 
Page 99 5- Hufford 
There is an observation o r two that might be made 
about the current structure: 
Today, local governments' ability to plan and 
finance long range projects and to respond to 
emergent situations is severely limited by the 
fixed property tax reveQue base created by 
Proposition 13. This f orces local government 
to continually go to Sacramento for the 
solution to local problems and dilutes local 
elected officials' ~esponsibility and 
accountability to the public for these 
solutions. 
Second, competition for decisions at the local 
go.vernment level is largely limited to program 
special interest groups, environmentalists, 
local h?meowner groups, property developers, 
and bargaining demands of government 
employees. There is no longer a "stake" in 
th•se de6isions by the homeowner, the general 
business community and families. The 
Proposition 13 tax revolt has enforced fiscal 
constraints on local government budgets. In 
I 
general, major policy decisions have largely 
shifted to Sacramento; 
The oversight of local government decision 
making rests with federal and state agencies, 
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the competition between internal groups, the 
media, and dissent between the elected 
officials -- as the RTD has learned the hard 
way; 
This raises the question of whether "benign 
neglect" by the general population is 
appropriate for such powerful institutions as 
the units of local government; 
Finally, the most recent events in Los Angeles 
in which a so called p9werful 
state/county/city commission has not been able 
to compete economically with a city of 1000 --
suggests that even a theoretical examination 
of the structure and governance of those 
public agencies might be warranted. 
In other words, I am suggesting that by focusing 
on the "trees" of local government program and fiscal 
issues, the state has brought us through the first ten 
year aftermath of Proposition 13. I would suggest that 
your agenda for the next ten years should be to focus on 
the "forest" -- that is, the role and financing of local 
purpose governments such as cities, counties, schools and 
special districts and their relationships to the state and 
to one another. This, of course, would be no easy matter. 
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It has a l ways been my view that units of 
government ought to combine program, financia l , 
operational and responsibility and political 
accountability in a sing l e agency. This, however, is 
easier said than done. It has also been my experience 
that it's almost impossible to for m or staff a group to 
study these issues, as each present stakeholder will 
negotiate mightily to ensure tha t the results of the study 
are not adverse to his organization's current self 
interest. 
The several efforts which have been undertaken --
from Governor Brown's 1978 Citizen's Committee chaired by 
A. Alan Post to Governor Deukmejian's New Partnership Task 
Force -- have led to programmatic and fiscal reforms, but 
the underlying concept of the role, structure and 
financing of state and local government has not as yet 
been successfully addressed. 
In addition to the suggestions made above, other 
issues to be examined should include: 
Governance and political accountability; 
Representativeness; 
Oversight; 
Incentives/Disincentives; and 
Stake-holding. 
' 
Pa~e 10~ -- Hufford 
As you well know, only this year these issues 
have surfaced in both transportation planning and 
management in Los Angeles County and 1n the statewide 
organization of the community college system. I believe 
this will be the next set of issues to be faced in dealing 
with the continuing tensions between the state and local 
governments. 
Thank you again for asking me to share my 
experiences and perspective with you. 
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CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: Thank you. 
our next witness, from the League of California Cities, is Jim 
Harrington. Jim is a legislative representative for the League of 
California cities. Prior to coming to the League, he spent seven years 
with the consulting firm of Ralph Anderson and Associates, where he was 
responsible for public finance practices. He has a background in local 
government with 15 years experience in city and county government. The 
California League of cities is a voluntary organization representing 
California's 444 cities. 
Is that correct? 
MR. HARRINGTON: Yes, 444, and working on a few more this year, 
too. 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: Yes, I'm sure we are. 
MR. HARRINGTON: This kind of a reunion for me. About 21 years 
ago, I went to work with Harry Hufford in L.A. county; my first job in 
the public sector. 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: Good training. You had a good training 
officer there. 
MR. HUFFORD: He's a good man, and he's getting bett~r and 
better. 
MR. HARRINGTON: Then I was also with the City of Irvine for 
the first almost eight years that it was a city, so it's been kind of a 
reunion for me. I was the Director of Administrative Services/Finance 
Director for the City here, and lived through the pre and post-Prop. 13 
era in this city. 
My remarks, I'm very aware that I'm the last speaker and the 
pressure on time. So I'll keep it brief. 
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There's a couple of points that I want to talk about, and one 
is what ' s happened to property tax revenues before and after, and then 
the effects on cities. 
First of all, I want to qualify a bit because I'm going to be 
generalizing about cities, and as soon as you generalize, whatever I 
say will probably not be true for any one of the 444 cities. So, as 
you know, cities do vary greatly, bot~ in size and nature. 
But just as a first item, what ' s happened to property tax reve-
nues before and after Prop. 13, cities were probably less impacted 
relatively than others because they were less reliant on property 
taxes. If you look at the year before , 1977-78, and then the year 
after, cities on the average were 22 percent of their revenues were 
from property taxes. A year later, that is reduced to 11 percent. So 
basically they took a ten percent cut in their overall revenues. 
Counties, on the other hand, were hit much more severely. 
Counties were -- about a third of their revenue base was on the average 
from property tax revenues. 
One of the interesting things , though, that I've seen happen 
after Prop. 13 is there was an initial reaction in dealing with the 
probl em. And a lot of this was living off of reserves, layoffs, an 
those things, but obviously there was still a cut. 
But if you look at the trend over all, property tax revenues 
have grown, and 1n ·fact an any o er revenues 
the cities have, to the point now where we're not quite recovered from 
where we were, but we're -- in 1985-86, property taxes had come back to 
19 percent of the total revenues, compared to 22 percent before Prop. 
13. 
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so, this raises some pretty good questions, I think, in terms 
of how does this occur with Prop. 13? The thing is , and the California 
Taxpayers Association pointed out in its study --
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: Do that for me again. I think I missed it. 
It was 22 --
MR. HARRINGTON: Before Pr op . 13 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: and i t's now 19? 
MR. HARRINGTON: Yes • 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: And where did it drop to after the passage 
of Prop. 13? 
MR. HARRINGTON : Immediat ely after it dropped to ten percent, 
so we've regained another 9 percent of our revenue base from property 
taxes. 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: Is that essentially because they're growing 
at a far greater rate than it was anticipated? 
MR. HARRINGTON : Yes, exactly, and at a faster rate than other 
city revenues , because other city revenues, for example the gas tax, is 
relatively constant. It doesn't respond as much to inflation; it's a 
price per gallon rather than a percentage of the price of gasoline. If 
it were a percentage of the price of gasoline, then obviously it would 
have gone up dramatically. 
But what it really says is that property tax revenues, not 
withstanding Prop. 13, have grown, in fact , faster t han the inflation 
rate. The California Taxpayers Association did a study about a year 
ago, where they noted that in the period s i nce Prop. 13, property tax 
revenues as a whole have averaged about 12 per cent. 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: Per year? 
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MR. HARRINGTON: Yes, which is kind of -- it kind of f l ies in 
the face of conventional wisdom, and so the question is why? Why is 
this? 
I think we need to look at what Prop. 13 does and what it 
doesn't do. 
First, Prop. 13 does not restri ct assessment of State assessed 
property. That is, property assessed by the State Board of Equaliza-
tion is not subject to Prop. 13. And that amounts to about six percent 
of total assessed values statewide. 
Secondly, Prop. 13 also did not restrict assessment of reas-
sessment of personal property: boats, airplanes, cattle, that sort of 
thing. That's about 6.5 percent, so about 12.5 percent of the total 
assessed value is outside the limit. 
The remaining portion, it's interesting to look at, when you 
look at the fact -- what most people remember is that it only goes up 2 
percent per year under Prop. 13. But there's also the provision for 
reassessment to current market value when property turns over or it ' s 
newly constructed. And this is the dri ving factor. 
It almost takes a chart to ful l y demonstrate it, but the years 
I was doing fiscal impact studies as a consultant, I did a lot of work 
in this area and I clearly demonstrated it, but what happens is, prop-
erty turns over at whatever rate, let's say every five years. There's 
occurs w enever 
the accumulative effect of five years of actual revenue growth. So, as 
soon as that property turns over, it goes from a low value to a high 
value. And if property turns over on regular cycles, then you're get-
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ting every year a five-year catch-up, or a ten-year catch-up, whatever 
your turnover cycle is. 
So over the long haul, other things equal, property turnover 
will cause property values to keep up with inflation. 
Then the other factor is, as new development occurs, that comes 
- on the market at full value. Which brings us to an interesting point, 
in that if you look at fire districts or others that have a lot of new 
development, cities, for example, that are growing rapidly, a lot of 
new construction, that value is coming on full cash value, today's 
value. Your inventory of existing property remains at a lower level 
until it turns over. 
So, this is what really, I think, has caused the growth in 
revenues in actual rate. 
One of the things that you need to look at, though, is not just 
Prop. 13, but also the cumulative effect of Prop. 13 and other limita-
tion measures we had. Actually, almost ironically, Proposition 13 
compounds the Proposition 4 problem. A case in point is a fire dis-
trict in Placer county, south Placer County, right by Sacramento, where 
the high tech industry has been growing: Hewlett Packard and a lot of 
nonresidential growth, a lot of commercial and industrial growth has 
been occurring. That's all new development coming on value at full 
cash value. 
That fire district has had a big surge in property tax reve-
nues, but their problem is, their Gann limit has not gone up according-
ly, because the Gann limit is only adjusted by population change and 
the CPI. So, all of this new development, commercial and industrial 
development, so they've shot way over their limits. They've had over-
Page lOS -- Harrington 
rides and really can't use the money to build additional fire stations 
and staffing to provide for this new development. 
Which brings us to the problem with Prop. 4 working together 
with Prop. 13. One tends to aggravate the other because if you're at 
your limit, you get new development and that new development is not 
residential development, it will drive you over the limit very rapidly. 
So where are we now as a result of some of these things? One 
observation is, and I think Harry Hufford touched on this a little bit 
in terms of the competition question, it's a little different twist 
that I observe, and that is that it's now really a zero sum game, and 
you certainly saw that with the no and low property tax issue versus 
the counties. It's a one percent limit, a one percent rate, and all 
entities within that have to compete for that resource. 
Statewide, cities you should know that cities get a small 
share. California Taxpayers Association reported that 13 cents of 
every dollar on the average goes to cities. The second largest is 
schools at 37 cents; counties get 33 cent~; and special districts as a 
whole account for 17 cents of every dollar. But obviously, from city 
to city, area to area, those numbers vary. 
But the important thing here is zero sum game. We're all com-
peting for that same one percent levy, and this really shows itself not 
only in the noes and lows issue, but annexations where there's city 
takeover of terzitory or a special district expands, and there is to be 
a readjustment of property taxes correspondingly. 
Some counties have adopted standard agreements on how those 
property tax revenues would be redistributed within the one percent. 
Others are left strictly to the negotiatiQn point of view. 
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My observation is that it hasn't worked very well in general. 
The same thing's true of incorporations, although there is in 
the statute a specific provision for how new cities, through property 
tax revenues, the basic rule of thumb is the dollars go to duties, so 
the property dollars are transferred from the agency giving up the 
service, usually the counties, to the city in proportion to that ser-
vice, how it's financed by the property taxes. If a city takes over 
$100,000 worth of police protection from the county, and 20 percent of 
that was financed by property taxes , then 20 percent of that 100,000 is 
transferred to the city. The dollars go with the duties. 
In concept, that works pretty well. In practice, it has not 
worked very well. There's a lot of conflict over what the real costs 
are, what the transfer should be. 
certainly redevelopment continues to be a real bone of conten-
tion, again, because of this zero sum game. We're dealing with a lim-
ited amount. 
Even in the area of new development, what we're finding now is 
counties, recognizing that new development coming on line at full cash 
value is very valuable in terms of revenue base, and we're finding 
urbanization of areas outside of cities that in past years in many 
counties you wouldn't see at all. 
I mentioned before the interrelationship of the various control 
measures. Not only does Prop. 4 compound the situation, but cities and 
really all local government entities now -- there was a mention earlier 
in terms of the flexibility the cities have. Certainly we have a 
broader revenue base, but one of the things that we now find ourselves 
in after last year, is that we're basically in the same box as every-
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body in that we, after Proposition 62 on the November ballot, we have 
to go to the voters with any increase or new tax, even in the areas of 
fees and charges. 
This morning you heard how Prop. 13 has caused a shift towards 
fee and charges. What I would comment on is what's happened is, fees 
and charges before Prop. 13 were largely subsidized by the general 
fund. In other words, cities weren't really charging full cost for 
what it cost to provide a recreation program, or what have you. 
The day after Prop. 13, for example, in this city, the council 
went to a policy that adult recreation programs shall pay for them-
selves. Before, recreation programs were subsidized by the general 
fund. So, I played in a local recreation football league, and my fee 
of $2.25 dollars went to $200 per team. That doesn't discourage us 
from playing, because per player it was only about five bucks, so it 
didn't really change that much. But those are the kinds of things that 
happened. 
What we face now with all these things, Prop. 62 and the stat-
utes, there is currently in the Government Code and the Rev. and Tax 
Code, a requirement that if a c~ty levies a fee in excess of the cost, 
that needs a vote, too. 
So basically what we've got is a referendum taxation and fund-
ing system, so that any new or increased tax, or even a fee, if it's 
going to create revenue beyond the cost of the service provided, re-
quires a vote. That puts us in that much more of a box. 
We have regained the general obligation bond authority, and 
there's been a mixed ability to do that. It's a two-thirds vote, still 
continuing to be a major challenge. About half of the cities that have 
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gone for general obligation bond issues have been successful; the other 
half have not. That's a very limited experience. They just got that 
authority last year. 
I think in the long-term for cities, Proposition 4 will proba-
bly have the greatest impact unless it's changed. The biggest problem 
with cities is, they're typically where most of the urbanization is 
occurring, where the economic development is occurring. The Prop. 4 
limit fails to recognize the impacts of economic development and 
growth. The adjustment factors from year to year are only for cost of 
living and for population increase, so a community like this one, that 
has had a lot of nonresidential development in the form of hotels, 
business and commercial development, there is no adjustment factor for 
that. That growth is beyond the CPI, obviously, because it's new addi-
tional growth. 
so, an unforeseen result of Proposition 4 is that it really has 
become anti-economic development because it puts a real damper, and 
cities have begun to say to development, if they're at their Gann lim-
it, "We would love to have you here, but we can't use the money you're 
going to generate, and you're going to generate more traffic, you're 
going to generate more police and those kinds of problems. You might 
either go elsewhere or we're going to have to have some other means of 
financing those services." 
--------Tn as~cally my comments and observations. I'd be glad 
to respond to any questions you might have. 
SENATOR BEVERLY: I asked earlier today about the success of 
such taxes as partial taxes, that sort of thing, on referendums. 
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MR. HARRINGTON: Yes, I wasn't anticipating that question, so I 
don't have the data with me. 
My impression is, there was a l imited attempt shortly after 
Prop. 13 to go to those. Some cities were successful. It's definitely 
not the prevailing practice by any means. 
After Prop. 62 now, it would require a vote of either a majori-
ty if it's a general tax, or if it's for a specific purpose, require a 
two-thirds vote. So, it become rather difficult a task to do that • 
. 
SENATOR BEVERLY: Do you have any reason to disagree with the 
pol~ing results given us by Marvin Field this morning? 
MR. HARRINGTON: Unfortunately I came in just at the tail end 
of that. 
SENATOR BEVERLY: He in general found in the last ten years an 
improvement in the confidence of the public in government at all 
levels, and two, that there was more readiness by the public to accept 
higher tax burdens for certain programs, education, police, fire, what 
have you. 
MR. HARRINGTON: That would tend to be supported by some re-
search that we did at the end of last year when we found, for example, 
the cities were at their Gann limit. When they went to the voters and 
asked for an override, they were essentially always successful. That's 
based on a very limited sample. There ' s only been eight override elec-
to a special tax increase. 
We have had successful tax elections as well, though. What has 
happened, though, my observation is that the voters will vote for them 
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if they're earmarked, which requires a two~thirds vote, which is kind 
of a double whammy. 
SENATOR BEVERLY: For example, we've seen partial taxes levied 
for the purpose of paramedic services. 
MR. HARRINGTON: Yes, after Prop. 13, there was fair success on 
those. 
I think that raises some public policy concerns, though, in 
terms of the effects of earmarking revenues, because those seem to be 
the ones that are successful, and the more you earmark things, the less 
you have for general fund purposes. 
So, for both general override purposes and tax measures, it's 
been very attractive to the voters to say: We pledge to use this money 
for transportation purposes, or police and fire, or those kinds of more 
attractive services. It's difficult to say: We're going to do it for 
maintaining sewers or less attractive programs. 
SENATOR BEVERLY: One last question. 
Is the League supporting any change now with reference to Prop. 
13? Any legislation or proposals or policies? 
MR. HARRINGTON: Not on 13. We are hoping to change Prop. 4 
some. 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: Thank you very much, Mr. Harrington. 
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I'd like to thank everybody. Is there anybody who would like 
to say something who hasn't had an opportunity to testify? Joel. 
Joel Fox is with the 
MR. FOX: California Tax Reduction Movement, which was started 
by Howard Jarvis. 
Thanks for the opportunity, Senator campbell 
I don't have any prepared remarks. I didn't anticipate being 
here today. I just found out about it a couple of days ago. 
I'm just going to make a couple of quick comments. · I know it's 
the end of the day. 
We think Proposition 13 has done a lot of what it was intended 
to do. First of all, as you mentioned a couple times, it saved some 
people's homes. They were being taxed out of their homes. 
A couple of other notes. I noticed as Mr. Field was going 
through his numbers this morning, he said that back in 1978, that the 
tax problem was number one on people's minds. It's not any more. I 
think a lot of that is because Proposition 13 worked. He said that 
people think government, local government, is more efficient today than 
it was in 1978. I'd like to give some of that credit to Proposition 
13. Some of the officials responded very well to the constraints put 
on them, and they made it work. 
so, I think Proposition 13 deserves some credit for those 
things that happened, that he had shown in his polls. · Not all that is 
negative. 
Let me touch on just two other quick things, then I'll be off 
or answer some questions. 
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The situation with the fees and benefit assessments that have 
come up. Prop. 13, when it was first judged constitutional by the 
supreme court back in 1978, the Amador case, the court recognized 13 
was an interlocking package. It was not just property tax any more, 
but there were constraints put on raising other taxes so that wouldn't 
be a way to get around the mandates of 13, keeping taxes low, by rais-
ing other taxes. 
I think a lot of that has occurred, fees and assessments. 
We're concerned about that. We don't want to restrict fees and assess-
ments, but we think people should have a say if they're going to be 
burdened with these fees and assessments. 
In fact, we are sponsoring a bill in the Legislature. It 
hasn ' t had any hearings yet. This will give people a majority vote say 
on some of these, not all of them, believe me, not all fees, just prop-
erty-related. 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: What bill is that? 
MR. FOX: It's ACA 27 in the Assembly. Ross Johnson has it. 
The Senate version is SCA 21, Ed Royce and Quentin Kopp are co-authors 
on it. It has not been heard yet in front of any committee. 
SENATOR BEVERLY: The one we've been getting all the postcards 
on. 
MR. FOX: Finally, the problem of the two homes, sitting side 
by s1 e, pay1ng up. 
That is a concern of ours also. 
A couple times it was mentioned that Paul Gann is looking for a 
change in that . My organization is a l so involved in that effort. ACA 
51, again by Ross Johnson, is the initial -- how shall I put it --
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we're just putting it out for debate. We see a problem and want it 
solved. ACA 51 in its initial form will not be its final form. We all 
realize that. We're going to go through the process. We want to hear 
trom a lot of people. I myself am speaking to the .California Assessors 
Association, the Board of Equalization in November. That's going to be 
the main topic of conversation. Then when the Legislature comes back 
in Session, we'll sit down and talk to Legislators. In fact, I was 
with Mr. Johnson yesterday in Sacramento, and we were talking about a 
bill that came up a couple years ago of Mr. Elder, solving the problem 
through the homeowner exemption, and that's something we just may go 
across the hall and talk to him about. 
So, ACA 51 may not be its last form, but I just want you to 
know that we are concerned about that problem, too. We hear about it 
all the time. And we think that perhaps a solution can be reached if 
we all work together on it. 
I'm going to just leave it there, and thanks for the opportuni-
ty of letting me come up and respond to some of the comments made. 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: There's no doubt that Proposition 13 did 
that for which it was intended. It did reduce property taxes. And it 
not only reduced, it stabilized them. 
I think as Mr. Field said this morning, it took that issue from 
being the key issue in the state to one of kind of lackadaisical 
interest today. I think 5 percent of the people list that as an issue 
today, and it certainly accomplished in that regard. 
My one concern is more philosophical than anything, and that's 
the thought that Mr. Hufford brought up, that I want to find some way 
to make the people at the local level more responsible and given them 
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some sort pf authority to raise revenue, at the same time, taking re-
sponsibility for t hat, getting it off the back of the Legislature. 
MR. FOX: As Mr. Hufford sai d, it's a real puzzle and it's hard 
to solve. I agree with him 100 percent. We ' ve been looking at that, 
too. 
Dr. Stubbl ebine had a few suggestions and we talked about them 
after he testified. ACA 51, in its ini tial form, when it was filed 
and it was filed during the budget bat tle and the rebate battle, so 
nothing was done with it, nothing has been done with it since it was 
filed at that point -- talked about subvention. I don't know if that's 
the answer in making up for some of the lost revenue. 
We're concerned about local control also. We're going to look 
at that issue. 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: That's the one downside, in my judgment, 
with Prop. 13. It removed not only the ability to make change, but the 
responsibility for accepting that change. 
That's one of the reasons people run for office, that in addi-
tion to their masochistic tenden~ies, and at the local level, they 
ought to have the oppo~tunity to enjoy some of that masochism. 
SENATOR BEVERLY: Y.ou and I were drafted. 
CHAIRMAN CAMPBELL: Absolutely. 
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Los Angeles, California 90048 
Telephone: (213) 936·4982 
Sept . 30, 198 : 
Honorable Chairman and members of the Legislature, on 
June 6, 1978, the people of California changed the tax-
ing system of the state . Proposition 13, authored by 
Howard Jarvis and the UNITED ORGANIZATIONS OF TAXPAYERS, 
was overwhelmingly approved by the voters, and according-
ly set three basic guidelines . First, Proposition 13 
set limits on property taxes by changing the Ad Valorem 
System of appraisal to a new acquisition value system -
with 1% used as the maximum assessment. Second, Propo-
sition 13 required the Legislature to have a two-thirds 
vote in order to increase or change any state taxes. 
And, Proposition 13 specifically authorized the imposition 
of local special taxes, but with a two thirds vote of 
electors in cities, counties, and special districts. 
No new Ad Valorem taxes were allowed under Proposition 
13. 
What w~re the results of the new Constitutional Ammendment 
Article XIIIA? Several million homes in California were saved from 
foreclosure because people could not afford the previously burgeorring 
property taxes . Senior Citizens on fixed incomes were now protected 
and not forced to sell or move to lesser quarters. And, young people, 
and first time home buyers, found predictability in ·the property. tax 
impounds, and thus they could realistically buy homes for their familie! 
that were within their budgets. 
Other residual, long term economic benefits have resulted from 
Proposition 13. The movements of new companies to California, and 
the stimulus to the construction industry has resulted in over a 
million new jobs in California over the past 9 years. The new dis-
poseable income to California tax a e ~~ne 
Howard Jarvis, President & Chief Officer 1967-1986 
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private sector provid i ng job growth and new investments in 
businesses resulting i n record sQ l es and income taxes to state 
and 1 ocal governments. 
In order for us to continue the eco nomic gains in Califo r nia from 
the advent of Proposition 13, we recommen d the fo l lowing: 
1. That no changes be made to Article 13A , 
2. That special taxes for ocal us e s be more clearly defined 1 
3. That the homeowners• property tax exemption, provided for 
in Article 13(3K) be changed to the use of a "percent" of 
sale (market) price -with qualified renter credits adjusted 
accordingly. 
4. That fees for infrastructure on new construction be identified 
from regular building perm i t costs, and that these one time 
charges not be part of the base (sale price) of buildings 
for subsequent annual tax l evies. 
Action on items 3 and 4 (above) cou l d be coordinated and solutions 
to the "tax on fee" escalation might be worked out in one tax reform 
package by legislation. 
We stand ready to aid state and l ocal governments in legislation 
that is both responsive to curre nt needs, and consistent with the 
guide lines of PROPOSITION 13. 
ED/ed 
en c l . 
r nest Dynda, 
President 
Governing Board 
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September 15, 1987 
Honorable William Campbell, Chairman 
Joint Legislative Budget Committee 
1100 J Street, Suite 522 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Dear Mr. Campbell: 
Thank you for the notification of the Prop. 13 
(10 years later) hearings. 
Since there is no room on the agenda for me to pre-
sent my views verbally, I will do so in this letter. 
The overall impact of Prop. 13 does not bother me 
as much as the continuing disregard for the in-
equities of locking districts into an unfair tax 
base to support schools. 
Two districts in Kern County receive $600.-$900.00 
more per student to educate students than does 
Delano Joint Union High School District. This 
totals $27,000. more per teacher. No one can truly 
justify this unequal opportunity for a fair edu-
cation, but the Sacramento bureacrats continue to 
state that, "we are only a little off the average". 
All this means is that there are many districts 
like ours where the students are being cheated. 
Do you o r any legislator have any idea what the 
difference of $27,000. per teacher means in the 
quality of education to our students? 
I'm not asking to take money away from Kern Union 
High School District or Taft Union High School 
District, but they could easily do without increases 
ave nots catch up. 
I would be p l eased to d i scuss this with you . 
Sincerely , 
.. _ ;_;,/ - · l ,.. I .-" 7t I 
/ ]..:_/ J.((lt kl (. ~ ,(~.1ft~ 
. Leona r d F. Dalton, Super intendent 
LFD: jc 
c c : Boa r d o f Tr ustees 
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September 28, 1987 
Senator William Campbell 
Chairman 
Joint Legislative Budget Committee 
1100 "J" Street, Suite 522 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Dear Senator Campbell: 
Elden F. Gillespie 
Mayor 
Joy L Neugebauer 
Mayor Pro Tern 
Frank G. Fry, Jr. 
Councilman 
Anita Huseth 
Councilwoman 
Charles V. Smith 
Councilman 
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on "Proposition 13 
Ten Years Later" and "California's Infrastructure Needs in 
the Year 2000 " . I" will begin by rel ating my thoughts on Proposi-
tion 13, and then address the infrastructure. 
In general terms, Proposition 13 was the first of several signifi-
cant actions that reduced revenue to local government. In one way 
or another, all of these actions have caused cities and counties to 
look to the State (who else has a surplus?) for financial assist-
ance. As the needs become greater, the pleas for help will grow 
louder I assure you. I think you wi ll also see local government 
(cities and counties) continue to e l iminate--at an ever-increasing 
rate--non-essential services. This, in turn, will put a greater 
demand on similar services offered by the State. A recent incident 
in Westminster clearly illustrates this trend. A resident utilized 
the services of a local car wash and, · in the process, the trim on 
his automobile was damaged. The car wash operator claimed that 
the chrome was damaged before the car was washed, and that nothing 
could be done. The resident then contacted the City asking for 
assistance . I had our staff contact the Orange County Office of 
Consumer Af f airs only to find that due to budgetary considerations, 
the Coun t y no longer offered this service. Our City staff then 
checked t he white pages of the phone book under "State offices" 
a nd found the phone number for Consumer Affairs in Los Angeles. 
This information was passed on to t he resident and he, in turn, 
contacted the office, which had one more case to add to their 
workload which would otherwise have been handled by the County 
had suffi c i ent funding been available to support the continued 
-Gpe. · · · e. I am sure there are 
hundreds, possibly thousands, of similar circumstances that take 
place thr oughout the State on a weekly basis, and I am sure the 
number will continue to increase as revenue to local government con-
tinues to dwindle. 
On the positive side, reduced revenue may also encourage local 
government to become more creative and energetic in its efforts to 
meet constituent expectations with f ewer dollars. Much has been 
written regarding ways in which l ocal government can streamline 
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its operation and continue to provide levels of service which are 
satisfactory to elected officials, residents and the business 
community. At some point, it may even be that reduced revenue 
will enable taxpayers to see that local and state government do 
have financial limitations and some of the services provided may 
have to be undertaken by taxpayers directly at their own expense, 
or provided by government and businesses working together. 
In regard to infrastructure needs in the year 2000, which by the 
way, · is only 12 years away, I believe local governments will soon 
reach the point _where they will have great difficulty, not only 
in adding new services, but in repairing and replacing servic e 
that has been in existence for 20, 30, and in some cases more than 
50 years. As the operator of a water utility, the City of West-
minster is consistently reminded that water lines do not last for-
ever. Recently, we seem to experience at least one water main break 
per month, and sometimes two or three, and this is in a city which 
is relatively new (30 years old) and has done its best to install 
quality lines to insure long life. In older cities throughout 
California and those which have not taken the time or spent the 
money to plan ahead, I am sure the cost of replacement in the 
future will be staggering. Since water is a vital utility, it will 
be -provided to the millions of Californians and, if necessary, I 
am sure the _State will be called upon to provide financial assist-
ance. 
Another one of our essential infrastructures--roadways--is in need 
of constant repair and rebuilding and, in this case, I believe the 
State is well aware of our financial situation since State funding 
has become more readily available over the years. However, we may 
be reaching a point where local funding with the current level of 
State financial assistance will not be able to handle increased . 
traffic which, except for remote areas of the State, is becoming 
a critical problem. I can remember when--not too many years ago--
there was very little to see when driving between Los Angeles and 
San Diego except open space. Now, when driving between these 
two areas, there is very little to see except urbanization! Unless 
something is done on a State-wide basis, which will require levels 
of funding only the State can provide, California will begin to 
have less and less appeal to the industries which have made our 
State so prosperous. 
In summary, I believe that Proposition 13 and the infrastructure · 
needs of the future will require that the State play a greater 
role in providing local government with the necessary financial 
resources to carry on. 
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